下面这个故事摘自山东人民出版社出版的《社会学家茶座》2003 年第 4 期，作者是庄朝晖。这个故事蕴含着丰富的博弈论思想，也可 以从中看到一个社会是如何陷入“囚徒困境”的。 有几个朋友凑成一桌饭局，酒酣耳热之际，席间上来了一条鱼。 诸位朋友正互相谦让，一阵妖风吹来，灯灭了。在一片沉寂之中，突 然听得数声惨叫

第一章公共经济学的基础 第一节公共经济学的方法论基础 一、实证分析与规范分析 二、归纳法与演绎法 三、博弈论方法 四、成本与收益分析法 第二节公共经济学的理论基础

Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first- and second-price auctions. I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2 The first-price auction may be inefficient even with private values Both examples I am going to show are due to Eric Maskin(to the best of my knowledge) The first point I wish to make is that, even in a private-values setting, asymmetries may

博弈论案例一一田忌赛马 远方灰尘尽处,徒现城池一座,遥望城 门,大大的旗帜上绣着一个字,“齐”。大 摇大摆入得城门,却浑然不见一人,诺大个 都城,犹如无人之境。好不容易寻得个老者, 细细打听之下,方知上至皇亲国戚、达官贵 人,下至往来商贾、平民布衣皆往校场而去。 盖大将军田忌与齐王以千金为赌,三场赛马 决胜负。虽田忌此前惯与大王赛马,但未有 胜绩,且此回大将军一掷千金,故引得诸班 人等空城而

Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics

NOTE: On the“ ethics” of problem sets Some of the theoretical exercise I will assign are actually well-known results; in other cases you may be able to find the answer in the literature. This is certainly the case for the current My position on this issue is that, basically, if you look up the answer somewhere it's your problem. After all, you can buy answer keys to most textbooks. The fact is, you will not have access to such, ehm, supporting material when you take your generals, or, in a more

1. Machines Extend Proposition 151. 1(the Perfect Folk Theorem with discounting)to arbitrary mixtures of payoff profiles of the original game G=(N, (Ai, lilieN Allow for both rational and real weights on the set of profiles u(a): aE A]; note that the statement of the result will involve an approximation of the payoff profile Construct a machine that implements the strategies in your proof

Player i is rational\;R=nieN Ri. Also, Bi(E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and B(E)=neN Bi(E). This is as in Lecture 7. Let me introduce the following notation for iterated mutual certainty: B()(E)=E B()(E)=B(B-I)(E)). Then the definition of Bk in Lecture 7 can be rewritten as Bk

Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all\strategically relevant\information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be uspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct

Introduction One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter