Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics

Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first- and second-price auctions. I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2 The first-price auction may be inefficient even with private values Both examples I am going to show are due to Eric Maskin(to the best of my knowledge) The first point I wish to make is that, even in a private-values setting, asymmetries may

Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\to thethe- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e behavioral) characterization of rationalizability a review of the basic definitions For your convenience, I summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive

Introduction This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof); (2)to highlight the assumptions implicit in the conventional usage of the framework, and the possible departures; (3) to discuss its potential problems, as well as some solutions to the latter

Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. Review of key definitions Recall our three payoff aggregation criteria: discounting, i.e (u2)≥1>(2 (also recall that the payoff profile corresponding to a stream (ut)is taken to be(1 8)2t18t-u(a)); limit of means

Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer to OR for details and definitions: I am following the textbook quite closely. of the game in which an incumbent faces a sequence of K (potential) entrants. It is clear that, in the subgame in which the last entrant gets a chance to play, the incumbent will

◼ Dynamic games of complete information ◼ Extensive-form representation ◼ Dynamic games of complete and perfect information ◼ Game tree ◼ Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium ◼ Backward induction ◼ Applications ◼ Dynamic games of complete and imperfect information ◼ More applications ◼ Repeated games

◼ Dynamic games of complete information ◼ Extensive-form representation ◼ Dynamic games of complete and perfect information ◼ Game tree ◼ Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium ◼ Backward induction ◼ Applications ◼ Dynamic games of complete and imperfect information ◼ More applications ◼ Repeated games

第一节 前言 一、公共经济学的起源 二、中国日益严重的公共问题 第二节 公共经济学的方法论基础 一、实证分析与规范分析 二、归纳法与演绎法 三、博弈论方法 四、成本与收益分析法 第三节 公共经济学的理论基础 一、公共经济的理论架构 二、从个人主义向集体主义转变 三、公平与效率原理四、边际革命 四、帕累托原理六、委托与代理理论

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