Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics
2-1 设 n 个人围坐在一个圆桌周围，现在从第 s 个人开始报数，数到第 m 个人，让他出局；然后从出 局的下一个人重新开始报数，数到第 m 个人，再让他出局，……，如此反复直到所有的人全部出局为 止。下面要解决的 Josephus 问题是：对于任意给定的 n, s 和 m，求出这 n 个人的出局序列。请以 n = 9, s = 1, m = 5 为例，人工模拟 Josephus 的求解过程以求得问题的解
