一、选择题(在A、B、C、D中选择唯一正确的答案,在你认为正确的答案前画“错 画、多画不给分。)每题2分,共20分。 1.简单商品经济的基本矛盾是()。 a.使用价值和价值的矛盾 b.私人劳动和社会劳动的矛盾 c.具体劳动和社会劳动的矛盾 d.生产资料私人占有和社会化生产的矛盾 2.相对剩余价值的生产() a.是在个别个别资本家追逐超额剩余价值的竞争中实现的 b.是通过延长工人的必要劳动时间实现的 c.是使生产商品的个别劳动时间低于社会必要劳动时间而多得的剩余价值 d.是通过资本家的贱买贵卖实现的

一名词解释(4分/题) 1氧化磷酸化系统(oridative phosphorylation system) 2.蛋白酶体(proteasome) 3.基体(basol body) 4粘着斑(adhesion plague) 5.钙粘蛋白(cadherin) 6.核孔复合体(nuclear pore complex

一.解释名词(3分/题) 1.增色效应2.蛋白质的变构作用3.米氏常数4.转换数 5.迟留时间(TR)6.空体积(VO)7.衰减调节8.DNA的半不连续复制 9.糖异生作用

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 6: Interactive Epistemology(1) Marciano Siniscalchi October 5, 1999 Introduction This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric- tions on rational play, or perhaps providing a consistency check for our predictions about

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 8.5: More on Auctions; PS#1 Marciano Siniscalchi October 14, 1999 Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first-and second-price auctions I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2

1999年自然变态法试题 1.如何解决我国科研经费投入偏低的问题? 2.请设计一种科学发展模式,它能较好地克服库恩模式和波普尔模式存在地问题? 3.如何从哲学和科学两个层次理解“观察的可重复性”? 4.结合科技史的案例或自己的研究实例,说明科学研究的一般途径?

1992年量子力学考研试题 (类似1999年第一题)质量为m的粒子,在一维无限深势 阱中 0≤ x<0 中运动,若t=0时,粒子处于 y(x

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture8: Applications(1)Simultaneous Auctions Marciano Siniscalchi October 12, 1999 Introduction This lecture, as well as the next, exemplify applications of the framework and techniques developed so far to problems of economic interest. Neither lecture attempts to cover the example applications in any generality, of course; you may however find these topics of sufficient interest to warrant further study

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 7: Interactive Epistemology(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 7, 1999 Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\ to the the- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e. behavioral)characterization of rationalizability

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 5: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(2) Marciano Siniscalchi September 30, 1999 Introduction This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof);