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Recall the following definitions: in any model M=(Q, (Ti, ai, piie), Ri is the event Player i is rational\;R=nieN Ri. Also, Bi(E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and B(E)=neN Bi(E). This is as in Lecture

gametheory《经济学理论》 Problem Set 3: Due Thursday, October 28

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Consider an interdependent-values auction with two bidders, each of whom observes an i.i.d

gametheory《经济学理论》 Problem set 5: Due Tuesday, November 23

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From or:226.1.227.1.229.1.237.1.243.1 For 243.1, also prove that the reputational equilibrium is sequential