题1-1:图示单向均匀拉伸的板条。若受力前在其表面画上两个正方形a和b,则受力后正 方形a、b分别变为

Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first- and second-price auctions. I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2 The first-price auction may be inefficient even with private values Both examples I am going to show are due to Eric Maskin(to the best of my knowledge) The first point I wish to make is that, even in a private-values setting, asymmetries may

Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics

It is nearly impossible to design a linear￾phase IIR transfer function It is always possible to design an FIR transfer function with an exact linear-phase response Consider a causal FIR transfer function H(z) of length N+1, i.e., of order N:

人教A版高中数学必修2第二章 点、直线、平面之间的位置关系2.2 直线、平面平行的判定及其性质课件(1)

一、数列极限的性质 1有界性 定理1收敛的数列必定有界证设 lim xn=a,由定义,取=1,则N,使得当n>N时恒有xn-a<1