Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer to OR for details and definitions: I am following the textbook quite closely. of the game in which an incumbent faces a sequence of K (potential) entrants. It is clear that, in the subgame in which the last entrant gets a chance to play, the incumbent will

Good evening, my fellow Americans: Tonight I want to speak to you of peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. No other question so preoccupies our people. No other dream so absorbs the 250 million human beings who liv e in that part of the world. No other goal motivates American policy in Southeast Asia. For years, representatives of our Governments and others have traveled the world seeking to find a basis for peace talks. Since last September they have carried the off er that I made public at San Antonio. And that offer was this:

General Westmoreland, General Grove, distinguished guests, and gentlemen of the Corps! As I was leaving the hotel this morning, a doorman asked me, \Where are you bound for, General?\ And when I replied, \West Point,\ he remarked, \Beautiful place. Have you ever been there before?\

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made for payoff uncertainty

一、多维随机变量的概念 定义3.1设是随机试验E的样本空间,5,i=1,2,,n 是定义在Ω上的n个随机变量。将其构成一个n维有序数组 ξ=(51,52,…,5n) 称为n维随机变量(或称n维随机向量),称为ξ的第i个分量

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium On the other hand, it shows that essentially every individually rational payoff profile can

My Fellow Americans, I come before you tonight as a candidate for the Vice Presidency and as a man whose honesty and integrity has been questioned. Now, the usual political thing to do when charges are made against you is to either ignore them or to deny them without giving details. I believe we've had enough of that in the United States, particularly with the present Administration in Washington

Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I can add you to the list. You do not want to miss important announcements, do you? the course has a web page at http://www.princeton.edw

Unit Seven Text A I. Pre-reading Task II. Related Information Ill. Detailed Study I V. Outline& Summary V. Home Assignment

2凸函数及其应用 凸函数定义及其等价形式: 设f(x)在区间I上有定义,若对任意x1、x2∈I,A∈[0,1]成立不等式: