DESIGN METHODOLOGY goaL-- Produce design for chemical plant that: Is economically acceptable and Is operable,ie., eIs safe → Is controllable Is reliable,and Is environmentally acceptable

DEFINITIONS EQUIPMENT RATING: Given the input streams, operating parameters, and size parameters, determine the equipment performance and output streams EQUIPMENT SIZING: Given the input streams and the performance specifications, estimate the economically important size parameters using approximate methods EQUIPMENT DESIGN: Produce a design in enough detail to guide the fabrication of the item of equipment

Estimation of the inputs A computer exercise using real data Implementation problem and some solutions Estimation results in uncertainty Shrinkage and Bayesian inference to deal with uncertainty Imposing restrictions

The WBS is to serve as the basis for program/project technical planning, scheduling, cost estimating and budgeting, contract scope definition documentation product development, and status reporting and assessment (including integrated cost/schedule performance measurement)

Nash equilibrium has undoubtedly proved to be the most influential idea in game theory. enabled fundamental breakthroughs in economics and the social sciences. Its development was a major intellectual achievement; what is perhaps more important, it Recent foundational research has emphasized the subtleties in the interpretation of Nash equilibrium. This lecture deals with the technical details of equilibrium analysis, but also with these interpretational issues. However, a more precise appraisal of the situation must

Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all \strategically relevant\ information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be suspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct

By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made

These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first- and second-price auctions. I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2

By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium

Primary Structure Sequencing Nucleic Acids核酸序列测定 Chain termination method (dideoxy method), developed by F. Sanger Base-specific chemical cleavage, developed by Maxam and Gilbert Both use autoradiography- X-ray film develops in response to presence of radioactive isotopes in nucleic acid molecules