Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 3: Due Thursday, October 28 1. Asymmetric Auctions Consider an interdependent-values auction with two bidders, each of whom observes an i.i.d uniform signal E [0, 1]. Bidder i's valuation for the object is equal to vi
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 8.5: More on Auctions; PS#1 Marciano Siniscalchi October 14, 1999 Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first-and second-price auctions I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 4: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(1) Marciano Siniscalchi September 28, 1999 Introduction The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 13: Repeated Games(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 28, 1999 Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so will keep these notes to a minimum.] Review of key definitions
Unit 12 Claim and Settlement Points for attention: When making a claim, plan your letter as follows: Begin by regretting the need to complain Mention the date of the order, the date of delivery and the goods complained about
TAC Handout written by Maggie Johnson and revised by me. Three address code Three-address code(TAC) will be the intermediate representation used in our Decaf compiler. It is essentially a generic assembly language that falls in the lower-end of the mid-level IRs. Some variant of 2, 3 or 4 address code is fairly commonly used as an IR, since it maps well to most
Digital system: entity can process, transfer and store any kind of digital signals is Composed of individual digital logic circuits which are designed to perform specified function
