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Motional Electromtance Faraday Induction Law for V B Fields Lenz' law Faraday Induction Law for Time- Dependenct B Flux Linkage E in Terms of and A
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Object: to describe the fieds generated by electric charges and currents Mathematical tools A field is a function describing a quantity at all points in space
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This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof); (2)to highlight the assumptions implicit in the conventional usage of the framework, and the possible departures; (3) to discuss its potential problems, as well as some solutions to the latter
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One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter. mine equilibrium behavior. For instance, consider the simple two-stage entry deter- rence game in which potential entrant decides whether to enter a market or stay out, and the incumbent decides whether to fight or acquiesce after the entrant's move
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Class: Tue-Thu 10: 40-12: 10 [?] Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment. The Big Picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses. You will probably be familiar with the notions of simultaneous us. extensive-form game, perfect vs. imperfect information, complete us. incomplete information, Nash
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The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium brings both to the fore in a straightforward manner, and emphasizes their interrelation. From subgame perfection to sequential rationality
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Beginning with this lecture, we focus our attention on dynamic games. The majority of games of economic interest feature some dynamic component, and most often payoff uncertainty as well. The analysis of extensive games is challenging in several ways. At the most basic level describing the possible sequences of events (choices)which define a particular game form is not problematic per se; yet, different formal definitions have been proposed, each with its pros and cons
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儿童结核病(Tuberculosis in Children)
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清华大学数学科学系:数学试验 Experiments in Mathematics(讲义课件)数学建模初步
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Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I
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