Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 14: General Extensive Games Marciano Siniscalchi November 10, 1999 Introduction [By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 11 and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum.] Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 8.5: More on Auctions; PS#1 Marciano Siniscalchi October 14, 1999 Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first-and second-price auctions I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2
From Individual to Market Demand Functions Think of an economy containing n consumers, denoted by i = 1, … ,n. Consumer i’s ordinary demand function for commodity j is
23.1 Introduction 23.2 Group I introns undertake self-splicing by transesterification 23.3 Group I introns form a characteristic secondary structure 23.4 Ribozymes have various catalytic activities 23.5 Some introns code for proteins that sponsor mobility 23.6 The catalytic activity of RNAase P is due to RNA 23.7 Viroids have catalytic activity 23.8 RNA editing occurs at individual bases