This chapter was written so I would have something to talk about on the first day of class. I wanted to give students an idea of what economics was all about, and what my lectures would be like, and yet not have anything that was really critical for the course. (At Michigan, students are still shopping around on the first day, and a good number of them won’t necessarily be at the lecture.)
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 14: General Extensive Games Marciano Siniscalchi November 10, 1999 Introduction [By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 11 and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum.] Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made
1. Who am I? Chris Wallace, Lecturer at the Department of Economics, Oxford University and Fellow in Economics at Trinity College. 2. What do I do? Teach economics and research in the field of game theory. 3. Who are you? First year students taking either the Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) degree