一、已知无源二端网络ab端电压u=50√2cos(103t+10°)V 电流i=5√2cos(103t-26.9°)A a i 则网络的输入阻抗Z=8+j6 输入导纳y=0.08j0.06S

2003级《大学数学I》第一学期期末考试试题 一。填空题(每小题3分共15分) 2.1=fxy)y改变积次序为1= 3.假设f(x)是周期为2的函数,它在[-,]内的表达式为f(x)=x,则f(x)展开成Fourier级数时,bn=

外研版（三起）（2012）小学英语三年级下册Module 9 Unit 1 I've got a new book.教案

Ⅱ. Listening skills Identifying prices M: I want two correction pens and a notebook. How much are they? W: $1.95 for each correction pen. $5.00 for the notebook Q: How much does the man have to pay? 2. W: Ooh, it's only $9.8. I bet Jane would love this blue vase. Flowers are really her thing

Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\to thethe- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e behavioral) characterization of rationalizability a review of the basic definitions For your convenience, I summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive

Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer to OR for details and definitions: I am following the textbook quite closely. of the game in which an incumbent faces a sequence of K (potential) entrants. It is clear that, in the subgame in which the last entrant gets a chance to play, the incumbent will

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made for payoff uncertainty

Ⅱ. Listening skills Understanding Times and dates w: Oh, look at the clock It's 5: 15. I'll be late for Jennifer's birthday party! I was supposed to leave at 5 o'clock M: Don't worry! You still have some time. The clock is twenty minutes fast Q What time is it now?

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium On the other hand, it shows that essentially every individually rational payoff profile can

Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I can add you to the list. You do not want to miss important announcements, do you? the course has a web page at http://www.princeton.edw