Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 10: Extensive Games with (Almost)Perfect Information Marciano Siniscalchi October 19, 1999 Introduction Beginning with this lecture, we focus our attention on dynamic games. The majority of games of economic interest feature some dynamic component, and most often payoff uncertainty as well. The analysis of extensive games is challenging in several ways. At the most basic level describing the possible sequences of events (choices)which define a particular game form is not problematic per se; yet, different formal definitions have been proposed, each with its pros and cons
Eco514Game Theory 1. Game Theory Multiperson Decision Theory; Zero-Sum games Marciano Siniscalchi September 16, 1999 Administrative Stuff Class: Tue-Thu 10: 40-12: 10 [?] Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment. The Big Picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses
◼ Dynamic games of complete information ◼ Extensive-form representation ◼ Dynamic games of complete and perfect information ◼ Game tree ◼ Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium ◼ Backward induction ◼ Applications ◼ Dynamic games of complete and imperfect information ◼ More applications ◼ Repeated games
对策论 对策是有厉害冲突的各方所分别采取的决策. 对策论,亦称为博弈论,研究具有对抗、竞争、冲突性质的 问题 最早利用数学方法来研究对策论的是数学家E. Zermelo,他于 1912年发表了论文《关于集合论在象棋对策中的应用》.1944 年, Von Neumann和O. Morgenstern总结了前人关于对策论 的研究成果,合著了《对策论与经济行为》(Theory of Games and Economic Behavior)一书,使得对策论的研究开 始系统化和公理化,并具有了深刻的经济背景.1994年,在对 策论研究中作出突出贡献的Nash, HarsanyiSe和获得诺贝尔经济学奖