◼ Introduction to static games of incomplete information ◼ Normal-form (or strategic-form) representation of static Bayesian games ◼ Bayesian Nash equilibrium ◼ Auction
Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 13: Repeated Games(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 28, 1999 Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so will keep these notes to a minimum.] Review of key definitions
Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 3: Due Thursday, October 28 1. Asymmetric Auctions Consider an interdependent-values auction with two bidders, each of whom observes an i.i.d uniform signal E [0, 1]. Bidder i's valuation for the object is equal to vi
Introduction The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium brings both to the fore in a straightforward manner, and emphasizes their interrelation
Introduction Nash equilibrium has undoubtedly proved to be the most influential idea in game theory. enabled fundamental breakthroughs in economics and the social sciences. Its development was a major intellectual achievement; what is perhaps more important, it Recent foundational research has emphasized the subtleties in the interpretation of Nash
