Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I
ome of the theoretical exercise I will assign are actually well-known results; in other cases you may be able to find the answer in the literature. This is certainly the case for the current My position on this issue is that, basically, if you look up the answer somewhere it's your problem. After all, you can buy answer keys to most textbooks. The fact is, you will not
These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first- and second-price auctions. I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2
By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made
This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric-
This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\ to the the- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e. behavioral)characterization of rationalizability. A review of the basic definitions For your convenience, summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive
Marciano Siniscalchi October 28, 1999 Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so will keep these notes to a minimum.] Review of key definitions Recall our three payoff aggregation criteria: discounting, i.e
The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed envelopes. The object is then allocated to the highest bidder at a price which depends on every bid, according to some prespecified rule (e.g. \first-price\ or \second-price\rule). In many circumstances (e.g. mineral rights auctions)it is reasonable to assume that the value
Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all \strategically relevant\ information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be suspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct
