RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN THE NETHERLANDS L. Timmerman and A doorman IIA 3 Introductory remarks LI Position of shareholders under Dutch company law Historically, the position of shareholders in Dutch companies has been rather weak, especa ly when compared with that of the board of directors. As far as we know,no serious investigation has ever been conducted into the question of why the board of directors of a Dutch company has such a strong position. a parallel may exist with other phenomena in Dutch society, most notably the trust Dutch citizens have always put in their govemment and the acceptance of a very indirect form of democracy Whatever the reasons may be, the wea kness of the position of shareholders has made It unnecessary to direct special attention to the position of minority shareholders 1.2 Shift in powerin favourof shareholders ecently, we have witnessed a strengthening of the position of the shareholderat the expense of the power of the board of directors and the supervisory board. This shift in power in favour of shareholders may result in increasing attention for the position of minority shareholders in the com ing years The shift n power n favour of the shareho lder has many reasons, inchuding a recent nfluential advice from the Social and Economic Council t the Dutch gowernment and parliament the pressure exercised by institutonal nves tors on the Dutch govemmentand companies to lmit the use of anti-take-over devies, the expand ing shareholder base n the Netherlands and the increasing number of foreign profess ional nvestors n Dutch companes. This strengthened position of shareholders has also resulted n increased attention for the position of minority shareholders n the Netherlands. A god illustration of this is the legislative proposal for a new section 2: 1 18a that will give shareholders who hold I percent of the ssued capital the right to place an item on the agenda of ne general meeting of sharcholders. 1.3 Why minority protection? Before elaborating on the protection of minority shareholders in the Netherlands, it will be useful to make some short remarks on why minority shareholders should receive protection and what the ultimate goal of this protection should be. At least three different reasons justify ing minority protection come to mind. First, if the Dutch legal system does not provide adequate protection of minority shareholders compared with foreign legal systems, foreign investors will not invest in Dutch companies and Dutch investors will increase their investments in foreign companies Second, and related to the first point, weak protection of minority shareholders University of Groningen. functioning and thefuture of the rules applicable to statutory hwo-tierenmtities), 5 January 2001
RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN THE NETHERLANDS L. Timmerman and A. Doorman* III A 3 1 Introductory remarks 1.1 Position of shareholders under Dutch company law Historically, the position of shareholders in Dutch companies has been rather weak, especially when compared with that of the board of directors. As far as we know, no serious investigation has ever been conducted into the question of why the board of directors of a Dutch company has such a strong position. A parallel may exist with other phenomena in Dutch society, most notably the trust Dutch citizens have always put in their government and the acceptance of a very indirect form of democracy. Whatever the reasons may be, the weakness of the position of shareholders has made it unnecessary to direct special attention to the position of minority shareholders. 1.2 Shift in power in favour of shareholders Recently, we have witnessed a strengthening of the position of the shareholder at the expense of the power of the board of directors and the supervisory board. This shift in power in favour of shareholders may result in increasing attention for the position of minority shareholders in the coming years. The shift in power in favour of the shareholder has many reasons, including a recent influential advice from the Social and Economic Council to the Dutch government and parliament, 1 the pressure exercised by institutional investors on the Dutch government and companies to limit the use of anti-take-over devices, the expanding shareholder base in the Netherlands and the increasing number of foreign professional investors in Dutch companies. This strengthened position of shareholders has also resulted in increased attention for the position of minority shareholders in the Netherlands. A good illustration of this is the legislative proposal for a new section 2:118a that will give shareholders who hold 1 percent of the issued capital the right to place an item on the agenda of the general meeting of shareholders. 1.3 Why minority protection? Before elaborating on the protection of minority shareholders in the Netherlands, it will be useful to make some short remarks on why minority shareholders should receive protection and what the ultimate goal of this protection should be. At least three different reasons justifying minority protection come to mind. First, if the Dutch legal system does not provide adequate protection of minority shareholders compared with foreign legal systems, foreign investors will not invest in Dutch companies and Dutch investors will increase their investments in foreign companies. Second, and related to the first point, weak protection of minority shareholders * University of Groningen. 1. Entitled Advies over het functioneren en de toekomst van de structuurregeling (Advice on the functioning and the future of the rules applicable to statutory two-tier entities), 5 January 2001
TIMMERMAN DOORMAN Increases the average cost of capital for a company, putting it at a competitive disadvantage with foreign companies. A final reason for an adequate protection of minority shareholders rights is more normative. There seems to be no good reason why it should be considered fair and equitable to disproportionately disadvantag minority shareholders com pared with larger shareholders, only on the grounds that they hold fewer shares In our opinion, all shareholders, large or small, should receive adequate protection from the law 1.4 Who is the minority shareholder? In Dutch legislation, established case law and doctrine, you can look in vain for a general definition of a minority shareholder. Dutch law assesses whether a specific right or action should be given to a minority shareholder on a situation-to-situation basis and also decides from case to case whether one qualifies as a minority shareholder. This decision whether one hasa right or an action is usually described in Dutch law in tems of percentage of the issued share capital, but sometimes a lso terms of the absolute book value of the shares required, or as a combination of both. The fairness of this adherence to percentages in deciding whether a shareholder is a minority shareholder can be questioned. Dutch aw, for instance, perm its the issue of priority shares. These shares have special controlling rights attached to them, making It possible to control the company without holding a large percentage of the shares nd without providing large share of the company s capital. A consequence of this is that a shareholder providing the majority of the capital may sometimes not control the company. In such a case the majority shareholder is effectively in a minority position with regard to the exercising of controlling rights. Under Dutch company law, capital and control are not necessarily in line, so it is, in our opinion, impossible to define the concept of minority shareholder without bearing in mind the control situation in the company. When a company makes use of a specific control structure, whether that be priority shares, a pyramid structure, orpreference shares, percentages lose much of their relevance. Under these circumstances we would define minority shareholders as those shareholders who, irrespective of the amount of capital they provide, are unable to exercise any significant form of control within the company 1.5 What are minority rights? In Dutch company law several rights are given to all shareholders, irrespective of the num ber of shares they hold. Notall of these rights can be qualified as m inority rights The right to vote in the general meeting of shareholders, forexample, will usually not be a minority right for two reasons. First, because this right is not specific to minority shareholders and second, because this right usually has no significant meaning for minority shareholders. In the event of a disagreement, they will be the ones to lose the vote at the general meeting of shareholders In our opinion, for a right to be a true minority right, it needs to possess the characteristic that it crea tes the possibility that an outcome can be reached that is different from the outcome that the majority of the shareholders wish. This means that the minority shareholder can interfere through a minority right in the affairs of the company, thereby correcting the policies of the majority shareholder. Within the minority rights we draw a distinction between
TIMMERMAN/DOORMAN 2 increases the average cost of capital for a company, putting it at a competitive disadvantage with foreign companies. A final reason for an adequate protection of minority shareholders rights is more normative. There seems to be no good reason why it should be considered fair and equitable to disproportionately disadvantage minority shareholders compared with larger shareholders, only on the grounds that they hold fewer shares. In our opinion, all shareholders, large or small, should receive adequate protection from the law. 1.4 Who is the minority shareholder? In Dutch legislation, established case law and doctrine, you can look in vain for a general definition of a minority shareholder. Dutch law assesses whether a specific right or action should be given to a minority shareholder on a situation-to-situation basis and also decides from case to case whether one qualifies as a minority shareholder. This decision whether one has a right or an action is usually described in Dutch law in terms of percentage of the issued share capital, but sometimes also in terms of the absolute book value of the shares required, or as a combination of both. The fairness of this adherence to percentages in deciding whether a shareholder is a minority shareholder can be questioned. Dutch law, for instance, permits the issue of priority shares. These shares have special controlling rights attached to them, making it possible to control the company without holding a large percentage of the shares and without providing a large share of the company s capital. A consequence of this is that a shareholder providing the majority of the capital may sometimes not control the company. In such a case the majority shareholder is effectively in a minority position with regard to the exercising of controlling rights. Under Dutch company law, capital and control are not necessarily in line, so it is, in our opinion, impossible to define the concept of minority shareholder without bearing in mind the control situation in the company. When a company makes use of a specific control structure, whether that be priority shares, a pyramid structure, or preference shares, percentages lose much of their relevance. Under these circumstances we would define minority shareholders as those shareholders who, irrespective of the amount of capital they provide, are unable to exercise any significant form of control within the company. 1.5 What are minority rights? In Dutch company law several rights are given to all shareholders, irrespective of the number of shares they hold. Not all of these rights can be qualified as minority rights. The right to vote in the general meeting of shareholders, for example, will usually not be a minority right for two reasons. First, because this right is not specific to minority shareholders and second, because this right usually has no significant meaning for minority shareholders. In the event of a disagreement, they will be the ones to lose the vote at the general meeting of shareholders. In our opinion, for a right to be a true minority right, it needs to possess the characteristic that it creates the possibility that an outcome can be reached that is different from the outcome that the majority of the shareholders wish. This means that the minority shareholder can interfere through a minority right in the affairs of the company, thereby correcting the policies of the majority shareholder. Within the minority rights we draw a distinction between
RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS INTHENETHERLANDS positive and negative rights. By positive rights we mean the ability to initate policies by the company that would not have been pursued without the initiative(see nos 15-20). By contrast, negative rights refer to the possibility fora minority shareholder a group of minority shareholders to block a resolution that is desired by the majority(nos 21-26 ). In addition to these two categories we can mention a third: that of the so-called norma lising minority rights. These are rights that the minority shareholder can exercise to force the company to comply with statutory provisions or the articles of tion. In this report we will not treat these rights as a separate ategory since Dutch com pany lawdoes not conta in many ofthem2 In this report Chapters II and Ill give general overview of minority rights in the Dutch legislation. Chapters IV, V and vi deal with specific aspects of minority protection. The report ends with a conclusion. In this report decisions from the Enterprise Section of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal will be indica ted with OK (Ondernem ingskamer) Decisions of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands wille be indicated with HR (Hoge Raad). Their most important decisions are published in the Nederlandse Jurisprudentie(N)en Jurisprudentie, Onderneming en Recht (JOR) nd referred to by year of publication and by case number With BV we mean the Dutch variant of the private limited company, with NV the public lim ited company Rules protecting minority shareholders 2.1 Methods ofprotection of minority shareholders In Dutch company aw, rules protecting minority shareholders are mainly but not exclusively statutory in nature. As a result of the fact that minority shareholder protection has never received much attention, protection provisions are found scattered over several sources. both in hard lw and in soft law. Another distinction that can be made is between prov isions that provide minority protection in e narrow sense, usually giv ing shareholders certain rights and a remedy to effectuate these rights, and rules that are primarily directed at improving the availa bility of infomation and of market transparency. This second set of rules usually has a side-effect an improvement in the position of minority shareholders We will refer to this method of protection as protection in the broad sense. We will now discuss eight sources of minority shareholder protection 2.2 Book 2 ofthe Dutch Civil Code Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code which regulates the legal persons, such as the BV and the nv, may be regarded as the most important source forminority shareholders protection. It can be characterised as hard law and provides protection in the narrow sense. Perhaps its most fundamental prov ision offering protection for minority shareholders is section 2: 201(92) which prov ides for equal protection of the shareholders(see further nos 27-29) We can mentonsection 2: 222(112 ), sections 999-1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure and to tain extent. sections 2: 345-359 and 2: 15-16
RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN THE NETHERLANDS 3 positive and negative rights. By positive rights we mean the ability to initiate policies by the company that would not have been pursued without the initiative (see nos 15-20). By contrast, negative rights refer to the possibility for a minority shareholder or a group of minority shareholders to block a resolution that is desired by the majority (nos 21-26). In addition to these two categories we can mention a third: that of the so-called normalising minority rights. These are rights that the minority shareholder can exercise to force the company to comply with statutory provisions or the articles of association. In this report we will not treat these rights as a separate category since Dutch company law does not contain many of them2 . In this report Chapters II and III give general overview of minority rights in the Dutch legislation. Chapters IV, V and VI deal with specific aspects of minority protection. The report ends with a conclusion. In this report decisions from the Enterprise Section of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal will be indicated with OK (Ondernemingskamer) Decisions of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands wille be indicated with HR (Hoge Raad). Their most important decisions are published in the Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ) en Jurisprudentie, Onderneming en Recht (JOR) and referred to by year of publication and by case number. With BV we mean the Dutch variant of the private limited company, with NV the public limited company. 2 Rules protecting minority shareholders 2.1 Methods of protection of minority shareholders In Dutch company law, rules protecting minority shareholders are mainly but not exclusively statutory in nature. As a result of the fact that minority shareholder protection has never received much attention, protection provisions are found scattered over several sources, both in hard law and in soft law. Another distinction that can be made is between provisions that provide minority protection in the narrow sense, usually giving shareholders certain rights and a remedy to effectuate these rights, and rules that are primarily directed at improving the availability of information and of market transparency. This second set of rules usually has as a side-effect an improvement in the position of minority shareholders. We will refer to this method of protection as protection in the broad sense. We will now discuss eight sources of minority shareholder protection. 2.2 Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code which regulates the legal persons, such as the BV and the NV, may be regarded as the most important source for minority shareholders protection. It can be characterised as hard law and provides protection in the narrow sense. Perhaps its most fundamental provision offering protection for minority shareholders is section 2:201(92) which provides for equal protection of the shareholders (see further nos. 27-29). 2. We can mention section 2:222(112), sections 999-1002 of the Code of Civil Procedure and to a certain extent, sections 2:345-359 and 2:15-16
TIMMERMAN DOORMAN Except as is otherwise provided for in the articles, all shares shall rank pari passu in proportion to the A company limited by shares must treat shareholders and holders of depository receipts whose circumstances are equal in the same manner. Other im portant provisions for the protection of minority shareholders in Book 2 are sections 2: 15 about the nullification of resolutions, section 2: 220(1 10)about the right for shareholders who together hold a certa in percentage of the shares to convene a general meeting of shareholders, section 2: 343 prov id ing a shareholder an exit-opportunity in case the continuation of his shareholding can no longer be reasonably expected of him due to the conduct of other shareholders(no. 33), and section 2: 344-359 about the right to demand an inquiry(nos 30-31) 2.3 Book 3 of the Dutch Civil Code: class action Book 3 of the Dutch Civil Code, on property law in general, contains several im portant prov isions for m inority shareholders For m inority shareholders in Book 3 Is section 3: 305 relevant. This section allows minority shareholders to organise into an association or a foundation and to have the entity bring an action against the company for the benefit of the collective. It is not possible for the entity to sue for damages but it is able to request a declaratory judgement. With this declaratory judgement, the individuals involved can then sue for damages. An association or foundation is entitled to initate a class action if the association or foundation according to its articles of association and in practice, protects the same interest as the interest of the indiv iduals that has been violated and that the interests are fit for undling. Representativeness is not a condition or a hurdle, especally not when the association or foundation lim its its actions to its members. Section 3: 305a reduces the cost of litigation. These costs can be high, caused among other things by the obligation to be represented by counsel and the danger of being ordered to also pay the other party slegalcosts 2.4 Code ofcivil Procedure This book conta ins three relevant sets of provisions for the protection of minority shareholders. These are first sections 999-1002. which concern the annual accounts the annual report and the infomation that has to be added to the accounts and the report. Any affected party can demand that the company alter the aforementioned documents and bring them into line with a legal injunction, provided by the Enterprise Section of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. Refusal to do so is a crim inal offence. Second, section 2 14 offers minority shareholders the opportunity to request a provisional exam ination of witnesses in preparation for proceedings which are eing considered. Finally, section 84a offers minority shareholders the opportunity to demand in court that they will be allowed to inspect a private instrument Section 2- 201 is the relevant section for the Bv section 92 for the nv
TIMMERMAN/DOORMAN 4 Section 2:201(92):3 Except as is otherwise provided for in the articles, all shares shall rank pari passu in proportion to their amount. A company limited by shares must treat shareholders and holders of depository receipts whose circumstances are equal in the same manner. Other important provisions for the protection of minority shareholders in Book 2 are sections 2:15 about the nullification of resolutions, section 2:220(110) about the right for shareholders who together hold a certain percentage of the shares to convene a general meeting of shareholders, section 2:343 providing a shareholder an exit-opportunity in case the continuation of his shareholding can no longer be reasonably expected of him due to the conduct of other shareholders (no. 33), and section 2:344-359 about the right to demand an inquiry (nos 30-31). 2.3 Book 3 of the Dutch Civil Code; class action Book 3 of the Dutch Civil Code, on property law in general, contains several important provisions for minority shareholders. For minority shareholders in Book 3 is section 3:305 relevant. This section allows minority shareholders to organise into an association or a foundation and to have the entity bring an action against the company for the benefit of the collective. It is not possible for the entity to sue for damages but it is able to request a declaratory judgement. With this declaratory judgement, the individuals involved can then sue for damages. An association or foundation is entitled to initiate a class action if the association or foundation, according to its articles of association and in practice, protects the same interest as the interest of the individuals that has been violated and that the interests are fit for bundling. Representativeness is not a condition or a hurdle, especially not when the association or foundation limits its actions to its members. Section 3:305a reduces the cost of litigation. These costs can be high, caused among other things by the obligation to be represented by counsel and the danger of being ordered to also pay the other party s legal costs. 2.4 Code of Civil Procedure This book contains three relevant sets of provisions for the protection of minority shareholders. These are first, sections 999-1002, which concern the annual accounts, the annual report and the information that has to be added to the accounts and the report. Any affected party can demand that the company alter the aforementioned documents and bring them into line with a legal injunction, provided by the Enterprise Section of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. Refusal to do so is a criminal offence. Second, section 214 offers minority shareholders the opportunity to request a provisional examination of witnesses in preparation for proceedings which are being considered. Finally, section 843a offers minority shareholders the opportunity to demand in court that they will be allowed to inspect a private instrument. 3. Section 2:201 is the relevant section for the BV; section 92 for the NV
RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS INTHENETHERLANDS 2.5 Commercial Code n sections 8 and ll, the Commercal Code conta ins two provisions that can be pplied to protect the interests of a m inority shareholder. Section 8 gives a minority shareho lder the right to ask the court to demand the disclosure of the books and documents that the company is obliged to keep by law during legal proceedings Section 1 1 of the Commercal Code conta ins the obligation to subm it the entire accounts to the other party in legal proceedings. This obligation to subm it is restricted in the sense that it only exists with regard rtners while uncertain at best whethera minority shareholder qualifies as a partner 2.6 Securities Transaction Supervision Act 1995 This statute provides protection in the broad sense. For the purposes of minority shareholder protection, three aspects seem relevant. First, sections 3-6 prohibit the issue of shares to the public unless the company has made sure that adequate information is ava ilable to the investors. Second, sections 29-42 regulate the control and supervision of the securities markets by the Minister of Finance, or by other entities after delegation, the Minister of Finance has delegated his powers to the Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer. Finally, sections 46-47 make insider trading a crim inal offence. Recently, rules relating to a public offer have been incorporated into the Securities Transaction Supervision Act 1995. The purpose of these rules is to ensure that shareholders receive adequate and timely information about the public 2.7 Disclosure of Major Holdings in Listed Companies Act 1996 This statute provides protection to minority shareholders through the improvement of market transparency and information provision. This statute obliges anyone who passes certa in shareholding thresholds in either direction to report this to the company and the Minister of Finance, who will make the information available to the public. Again, the Minister of Finance has delegated his powers under this statute to the Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer 2.8 Listing and Issuing Rules These are rules developed by the Amsterdam Exchange, which is now a subsidiary of the Euronext Exchange, and to which a company that seeks a listing is bound through the listing agreement it enters into with the exchange. They can therefore be characterised as legally binding, but only in the relationship between the listed company and the exchange. The rules contain several provisions that protect inority shareholders. Examples are sections 8-24, which conta in the obligation to make a prospectus available when issuing securities and that give detailed information on what to include in the prospectus. A second example is section 26, which explicitly states that the issuing company is obliged to treat all shareholders who are in equal circumstances in an equal manner. Finally, section 28 is ant section, giv ing a detailed omation that
RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN THE NETHERLANDS 5 2.5 Commercial Code In sections 8 and 11, the Commercial Code contains two provisions that can be applied to protect the interests of a minority shareholder. Section 8 gives a minority shareholder the right to ask the court to demand the disclosure of the books and documents that the company is obliged to keep by law during legal proceedings. Section 11 of the Commercial Code contains the obligation to submit the entire accounts to the other party in legal proceedings. This obligation to submit is restricted in the sense that it only exists with regard to partners , while it is uncertain at best whether a minority shareholder qualifies as a partner. 2.6 Securities Transaction Supervision Act 1995 This statute provides protection in the broad sense. For the purposes of minority shareholder protection, three aspects seem relevant. First, sections 3-6 prohibit the issue of shares to the public unless the company has made sure that adequate information is available to the investors. Second, sections 29-42 regulate the control and supervision of the securities markets by the Minister of Finance, or by other entities after delegation; the Minister of Finance has delegated his powers to the Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer. Finally, sections 46-47 make insider trading a criminal offence. Recently, rules rela ting to a public offer have been incorporated into the Securities Transaction Supervision Act 1995. The purpose of these rules is to ensure that shareholders receive adequate and timely information about the public bid. 2.7 Disclosure of Major Holdings in Listed Companies Act 1996 This statute provides protection to minority shareholders through the improvement of market transparency and information provision. This statute obliges anyone who passes certain shareholding thresholds in either direction to report this to the company and the Minister of Finance, who will make the information available to the public. Again, the Minister of Finance has delegated his powers under this statute to the Stichting Toezicht Effectenverkeer. 2.8 Listing and Issuing Rules These are rules developed by the Amsterdam Exchange, which is now a subsidiary of the Euronext Exchange, and to which a company that seeks a listing is bound through the listing agreement it enters into with the exchange. They can therefore be characterised as legally binding, but only in the relationship between the listed company and the exchange. The rules contain several provisions that protect minority shareholders. Examples are sections 8-24, which contain the obligation to make a prospectus available when issuing securities and that give detailed information on what to include in the prospectus. A second example is section 26, which explicitly states that the issuing company is obliged to treat all shareholders who are in equal circumstances in an equal manner. Finally, section 28 is an important section, giving a detailed overview of the information that the issuing
TIMMERMAN DOORMAN company has to provide to the public. It contains the general obligation to make vaila ble all the facilities and information necessary for the shareholders to be able to exercise their rights. The most important, more specific, obligation can be found in section 28h. This provision conta ins the obligation to immediately make a vailable a publication on every fact or event concerning the issuing company that can be expected to significantly influence the price of the company sstock 2. 10Corporate Governance in the Netherlands, report by the Peters Committee In 1996 and 1997, the Corporate Govemance Comm ittee(also called the Peters Comm ittee after its cha irman) presented two reports(a draft and a final version) Among other things, these reports conta ined 40 recommendations conceming corporate governance in the Netherlands. The report mainly focuses on the relationship between the board of directors, the supervisors and the shareholders. It pleads for a strengthening of the position of shareholders and urges them to participate more actively in the affairs of the company. The report is an example of a code of best practice in the sense that it is not legally binding, it merely makes recommendations. However, it does try to improve the position of the shareholder in a direct way. Examples include recommendation 26, which asks companies and investors to reassess the role played by shareholders, based on the principle that capital and control should be in line, and recommendation 29 which asks management to assess the desirability of an increased influence of investors and how to achieve this Recommendation 27, the general meeting of shareholders should be the forum to which the supervisory board and the board of directors report and are accountable, recommendation 28, the board of directors and the supervisory board recommendation 30, requests made by investors who represent 1%or m, and capital or NLG 500,000 in shares to have items placed on the agenda should n nciple be honoured, are more detailed It was left to companies t voluntarily adopt the recommendations. Evalation showed that only a small percentage of Dutch firms made significant changes to their corporate govemance poliy and that conformation was particularly weak with regard to those recommendatons concemng increased shareholder power. Therefore, the Dutch govemmenthas started to translate someof these recommendations nto legslation. A god example is the proposal for anewsection 2: 1 14a that will give shareholders who hol I percent of the issued capital or shares with a market value ion(this concems listed companies) the right to place an item on the agenda of the general meeting of shareholders. Ths s a direct legal translation of recommendation 30 of the Peters Committee. Another example s the new provision n Book 2 that adoption/approval of the annual accounts does not imply a discharge for the board members from liability for their management Under thi new rule, both have to be separate items on the agenda of the general meeting of Commissie Corporate Governance, Corporate Govemance in Nederland: Een aanzet bt reranderng en een uitnodigmg tot discussie( Corporate Govemance n the Netherlands: An initial impetus for change and an invitation for dscussion ) 28 October 1996 and Commissie Corporate Govemance, Coporate Govemance in Nedertand: Veertig aanbenelingen( Coporate goleman in the Netherlands: Fortyrecowmmendations ), 25 June 1997
TIMMERMAN/DOORMAN 6 company has to provide to the public. It contains the general obligation to make available all the facilities and information necessary for the shareholders to be able to exercise their rights. The most important, more specific, obligation can be found in section 28h. This provision contains the obligation to immediately make available a publication on every fact or event concerning the issuing company that can be expected to significantly influence the price of the company s stock. 2.10Corporate Governance in the Netherlands; report by the Peters Committee In 1996 and 1997, the Corporate Governance Committee (also called the Peters Committee after its chairman) presented two reports4 (a draft and a final version). Among other things, these reports contained 40 recommendations concerning corporate governance in the Netherlands. The report mainly focuses on the relationship between the board of directors, the supervisors and the shareholders. It pleads for a strengthening of the position of shareholders and urges them to participate more actively in the affairs of the company. The report is an example of a code of best practice in the sense that it is not legally binding; it merely makes recommendations. However, it does try to improve the position of the shareholder in a direct way. Examples include recommendation 26, which asks companies and investors to reassess the role played by shareholders, based on the principle that capital and control should be in line, and recommendation 29 which asks management to assess the desirability of an increased influence of investors and how to achieve this. Recommendation 27, the general meeting of shareholders should be the forum to which the supervisory board and the board of directors report and are accountable, recommendation 28, the board of directors and the supervisory board should have the confidence of the general meeting of shareholders, and recommendation 30, requests made by investors who represent 1% of the issued capital or NLG 500,000 in shares to have items placed on the agenda should in principle be honoured, are more detailed. It was left to companies to voluntarily adopt the recommendations. Evaluation showed that only a small percentage of Dutch firms made significant changes to their corporate governance policy and that conformation was particularly weak with regard to those recommendations concerning increased shareholder power. Therefore, the Dutch government has started to translate some of these recommendations into legislation. A good example is the proposal for a new section 2:114a that will give shareholders who hold 1 percent of the issued capital or shares with a market value of _ 50 million (this concerns listed companies) the right to place an item on the agenda of the general meeting of shareholders. This is a direct legal translation of recommendation 30 of the Peters Committee. Another example is the new provision in Book 2 that adoption/approval of the annual accounts does not imply a discharge for the board members from liability for their management. Under this new rule, both have to be separate items on the agenda of the general meeting of 4. Commissie Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance in Nederland: Een aanzet tot verandering en een uitnodiging tot discussie (Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: An initial impetus for change and an invitation for discussion), 28 October 1996 and Commissie Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance in Nederland: Veertig aanbevelingen (Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: Forty recommendations), 25 June 1997
RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS INTHE NETHERLANDS An overview of minority rights 3.1 Overview of the thresholds for minority shareholders rights (p minority rights) Scattered throughout book 2 of the Civil Code there are several different thresholds or m inority shareholders to qualify fora right. The most im portant positive m inority shareholders rights are listed below, including the num berof shares the shareholder has to hold in order to be able to exercise the correspondingright 3.2 A single share The following rights attached to a single share are minority rights Section 2: 222(112) The right to convene a general meeting of shareholders when those who are authorised under section 2: 219(109)or thearticles have failed to do so but only after authorisation by the President of the District Court. Section 2: 222(112) Is an example of a normalising m inority right(see no 5) Section 2: 343 The right to demand in court that one s shares will be acquired by other shareholders when one s rights or interests are prejudiced by the conduct of one or more co-shareholders to such an extent that the continuation of the shareholding can no longer reasonably be expectedofone Sections 999-1002 Code of Civil Procedure The right to request the company to alter the annual accounts and annual report and to bring them into line with a legal Injunction. These sections are also an example of a normalising minority right(see 3.3 5%ofthe issued capital Section 2: 33/ The right to prevent a transferee company resolving to merge by a resolution of the board of directors Under nomal circumstances a company merges by resolution of its general meeting of shareholders(section 2: 317 subsection 1) However, the law makes an exception to this rule for the transferee company on the grounds that for such company a merger can possibly be of little importanceand does not substantally affect the position of the shareholders. If the articles do not prevent this, and if the company has sta ted its intention to do so in the published notice of the deposit of the merger proposal, a merger by a resolution of the board of directors is possible. However, subsection 3 enables a group that represents at least 5%of the ssued capital to prevent this by requesting the board of directors to convene a general meeting of shareholders to decide on the merger within one month after such Section 2: 334ff The right to prevent the transferee company resolving upon the division by a resolution of the board of directors. This right is comparable with the right to prevent a the company resolving to merge by a resolution of the board of directors
RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN THE NETHERLANDS 7 shareholders. 3 An overview of minority rights 3.1 Overview of the thresholds for minority shareholders rights (positive minority rights) Scattered throughout Book 2 of the Civil Code, there are several different thresholds for minority shareholders to qualify for a right. The most important positive minority shareholders rights are listed below, including the number of shares the shareholder has to hold in order to be able to exercise the corresponding right. 3.2 A single share The following rights attached to a single share are minority rights. Section 2:222(112) The right to convene a general meeting of shareholders when those who are authorised under section 2:219(109) or the articles have failed to do so, but only after authorisation by the President of the District Court. Section 2:222(112) is an example of a normalising minority right (see no. 5). Section 2:343 The right to demand in court that one s shares will be acquired by other shareholders when one s rights or interests are prejudiced by the conduct of one or more co-shareholders to such an extent that the continuation of the shareholding can no longer reasonably be expected of one. Sections 999-1002 Code of Civil Procedure The right to request the company to alter the annual accounts and annual report and to bring them into line with a legal injunction. These sections are also an example of a normalising minority right (see no. 5). 3.3 5% of the issued capital Section 2:331 The right to prevent a transferee company resolving to merge by a resolution of the board of directors. Under normal circumstances a company merges by resolution of its general meeting of shareholders (section 2:317 subsection 1). However, the law makes an exception to this rule for the transferee company on the grounds that for such company a merger can possibly be of little importance and does not substantially affect the position of the shareholders. If the articles do not prevent this, and if the company has stated its intention to do so in the published notice of the deposit of the merger proposal, a merger by a resolution of the board of directors is possible. However, subsection 3 enables a group that represents a t least 5% of the issued capital to prevent this by requesting the board of directors to convene a general meeting of shareholders to decide on the merger within one month after such publication. Section 2:334ff The right to prevent the transferee company resolving upon the division by a resolution of the board of directors. This right is comparable with the right to prevent a the company resolving to merge by a resolution of the board of directors
TIMMERMAN DOORMAN 3.4 10%of the issued capito Section 2: 220(110) The right to convene a general meeting of shareholders. This right is restricted in several ways because convening a general meeting of shareholders without the consent of the board of directors amounts materially to a deed of mistrust and can thereby harm the interests of the company Section 2: 346 The right to ask for an inquiry. This right will be discussed in more detail in nos 30-31 3.5 173 ofthe issued capital Sections 2: 336 and 2 342 The right to demand in court that a shareholder usufructuary or pledgee of a share who has the right to vote transfers his shares or his voting right should his conduct prejudice the interests of the company to such an extent that continuation of his shareholding or of his exercise of the voting right asonably be tolerated 3.6 Analysis ofthe above-mentioned thresholds The rights of shareholders or a group of shareholders who have reached a certain threshold refer to four different criteria: a single share, 5%, 10% and 33 1/3%. First It is interesting to note the low threshold for asking for an inquiry. Even though the initial hurdle seems rather high, 10%of the issued capital, it is significantly lowered by stating that it also suffices to hold shares with a nom inal value of 225,000 Especially for large companies, this 225, 000 threshold is much lower than the 10% of the issued capital hurdle. This cannot but reflect the fact that the Dutch legislator ide adequate protection to(smaller) minority shareholders. A second interesting point is that Dutch company law conta ins four different hurdles for exercising minority rights However, there does not seem to be any coherent thought behind this division into four categories. There seems to be no reason why, for example shareholder should require only 5% before being able to exercise the right to prevent a transferee company resolving to merge by a resolution of the board of directors, but 10%before he is a ble to exercise the right to convene a meeting of shareholders 3.7 Negative minority rights In the following nos. an overview of qualified quorums and ma jorities is geven which Book 2 prescribes 3.8 Blocking power fora single shareholder Section 2: 15 The right to ask for nullification of a resolution if the shareholder who requests nullification has a reasonable interest in the due performance of the obligation which has not been perfomed. This right can be exercised with regard to a resolution by any constituent body of the legal person Section 2: 231(121) Subsections I and 3 lim it the amendment of the articles of
TIMMERMAN/DOORMAN 8 3.4 10% of the issued capital Section 2:220(110) The right to convene a general meeting of shareholders. This right is restricted in several ways because convening a general meeting of shareholders without the consent of the board of directors amounts materially to a deed of mistrust and can thereby harm the interests of the company. Section 2:346 The right to ask for an inquiry. This right will be discussed in more detail in nos. 30-31. 3.5 1/3 of the issued capital Sections 2:336 and 2:342 The right to demand in court that a shareholder, usufructuary or pledgee of a share who has the right to vote transfers his shares or his voting right should his conduct prejudice the interests of the company to such an extent that continuation of his shareholding or of his exercise of the voting right cannot reasonably be tolerated. 3.6 Analysis of the above-mentioned thresholds. The rights of shareholders or a group of shareholders who have reached a certain threshold refer to four different criteria: a single share, 5%, 10% and 33 1/3%. First, it is interesting to note the low threshold for asking for an inquiry. Even though the initial hurdle seems rather high, 10% of the issued capital, it is significantly lowered by stating that it also suffices to hold shares with a nominal value of _ 225,000. Especially for large companies, this _ 225,000 threshold is much lower than the 10% of the issued capital hurdle. This cannot but reflect the fact that the Dutch legislator has considered it necessary for the inquiry proceedings to provide adequate protection to (smaller) minority shareholders. A second interesting point is that Dutch company law contains four different hurdles for exercising minority rights. However, there does not seem to be any coherent thought behind this division into four categories. There seems to be no reason why, for example, a minority shareholder should require only 5% before being able to exercise the right to prevent a transferee company resolving to merge by a resolution of the board of directors, but 10% before he is able to exercise the right to convene a meeting of shareholders. 3.7 Negative minority rights In the following nos. an overview of qualified quorums and majorities is geven which Book 2 prescribes. 3.8 Blocking power for a single shareholder. Section 2:15 The right to ask for nullification of a resolution if the shareholder who requests nullification has a reasonable interest in the due performance of the obligation which has not been performed. This right can be exercised with regard to a resolution by any constituent body of the legal person. Section 2:231(121) Subsections 1 and 3 limit the amendment of the articles of
RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS INTHENETHERLANDS association. They state that if the articles exclude the power to amend certain provisions in the articles from the general meeting of shareholders or even completely exclude the power to amend the articles, such is nevertheless possible by a unanimous vote at a general meeting of shareholders at which the entire issued capital is represented. Section 2: 323 The right to ask for avoidance of a legal merger if the requesting shareholder has a reasonable interest. This section lists four grounds for avoidance of a legal merger. For the protection of minority shareholders, the right to declare voidance of the merger on the grounds of avoidance of a resolution of the general meetingof shareholders required for the merger is particularly relevant Section 2: 334u The right to ask for avoidance of a division of the legal person if the requesting shareholder has a reasonable interest. Generally speaking, the division of a legal person can be declared void forthe same reasons as apply to a legalmerger Section 2: 238(128)The articles of assocation may contain a provision that allows for the passing of resolutions by shareholders outside the context of a general meeting of shareholders. Relevant in this context is that even should the articles explicitly provide this option, resolutions may only be passed by a unanimous written vote of the shareholders entitled to vote 3.9 90% of the issued capital(blocking power when the minority group possesses more than 10%of the issued capital) Section 2: 18 A resolution to convert, passed in accordance with the requirements for a resolution foran amendment of the articles, and a 9/10 majority of the votes cast at the general meeting of shareholders are needed fora conversion from one legal entity into another. Section 2: 181(71)subsection 2 These sections give an additional right to minority shareholders. This right can be characterised as a positive right but will be discussed here because it is attached to the right embedded in section 2: 18. When a public or a private limited com pany is converted into an association, a co-operative oran insurance guarantee company one loses the quality of shareholder and becomes a member. Because this conversion fundamentally changes one s proprietary rights position, section 2: 181(71)offers any shareholder who has not consented to the conversion resolution the right to request that the company indemnify him for the loss of his shares 3. 102/3 of the wotes cast(blocking power when the minority group pe than 1/3 ofthe votes cast) Section 2: 206a(96a)subsection 7 In the event of a capital increase, there is in general a pre-emption right for the existing shareholders. However, section 2: 206a(96a) subsection 6 states that this pre-emption right may be restricted or excluded and that the general meeting of shareholders can transfer its powers in this matter to another onstituent body. Subsection 7 then states that for these decisions, a 2/3 majority of the votes cast is required if less than half of the issued capital is represented Section 2: 209(99) subsection 6 A reduction of the capital is possible by a resolution of the general meeting of shareholders. For the Nv, this resolution approval of 2/3 of the votes cast if less than ha lf of the issued capital is represented at
RIGHTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN THE NETHERLANDS 9 association. They state that if the articles exclude the power to amend certain provisions in the articles from the general meeting of shareholders or even completely exclude the power to amend the articles, such is nevertheless possible by a unanimous vote at a general meeting of shareholders at which the entire issued capital is represented. Section 2:323 The right to ask for avoidance of a legal merger if the requesting shareholder has a reasonable interest. This section lists four grounds for avoidance of a legal merger. For the protection of minority shareholders, the right to declare avoidance of the merger on the grounds of avoidance of a resolution of the general meeting of shareholders required for the merger is particularly relevant. Section 2:334u The right to ask for avoidance of a division of the legal person if the requesting shareholder has a reasonable interest. Generally speaking, the division of a legal person can be declared void for the same reasons as apply to a legal merger. Section 2:238(128) The articles of association may contain a provision that allows for the passing of resolutions by shareholders outside the context of a general meeting of shareholders. Relevant in this context is that even should the articles explicitly provide this option, resolutions may only be passed by a unanimous written vote of the shareholders entitled to vote. 3.9 90% of the issued capital (blocking power when the minority group possesses more than 10% of the issued capital). Section 2:18 A resolution to convert, passed in accordance with the requirements for a resolution for an amendment of the articles, and a 9/10 majority of the votes cast at the general meeting of shareholders are needed for a conversion from one legal entity into another. Section 2:181(71) subsection 2 These sections give an additional right to minority shareholders. This right can be characterised as a positive right but will be discussed here because it is attached to the right embedded in section 2:18. When a public or a private limited company is converted into an association, a co-operative or an insurance guarantee company one loses the quality of shareholder and becomes a member. Because this conversion fundamentally changes one s proprietary rights position, section 2:181(71) offers any shareholder who has not consented to the conversion resolution the right to request that the company indemnify him for the loss of his shares. 3.102/3 of the votes cast (blocking power when the minority group possesses more than 1/3 of the votes cast). Section 2:206a(96a) subsection 7 In the event of a capital increase, there is in general a pre-emption right for the existing shareholders. However, section 2:206a(96a) subsection 6 states that this pre-emption right may be restricted or excluded and that the general meeting of shareholders can transfer its powers in this matter to another constituent body. Subsection 7 then states that for these decisions, a 2/3 majority of the votes cast is required if less than half of the issued capital is represented. Section 2:209(99) subsection 6 A reduction of the capital is possible by a resolution of the general meeting of shareholders. For the NV, this resolution requires the approval of 2/3 of the votes cast if less than half of the issued capital is represented at
TIMMERMAN DOORMAN the meeting. There is no corresponding section for the BV, mainly due to the fact that this prov ision serves to protect the shareholders not present at the meeting. The underly ing view was that shareholders in a bv have closer links with the affairs of the company and that they will sooner apparat a meeting should they disagree with a proposed resolution Section 2: 330 This section conta ins a provision conceming the majority required for Section 2: 334ee Analogous to the legal merger, in the case of a legal division of a ompany, a resolution to divide an NV or a BV requires 2/3 of the votes cast should less than half of the issued capital be represented at the general meeting of shareholders 3.11173 of the votes cast(blocking power when the ity group possesses moi 2/3 ofthe votes Section 2: 243(133)sub section 2 It seems strange to discuss a provision that requires 2/3 of the votes cast and also represents at least 50% of the issued capital as a right belonging to a minority. However, if we define m inority in a broad sense, not only with regard to percentages of the capital, but also with regard to the controlling position in the company(see no. 5), this right can be seen as a minority right. The rticles may contain a provision that states that the appointment of a director by the general meeting of shareholders shall be made from a list of candidates conta ining the names of at least two candidates for each vacancy. The articles may grant this binding right of nom ination to everyone. Subsection 2 then states that the genera meeting may resolve by a resolution passed by a 2/3 majority representing more than half of the votes that such a nomination list shall not be binding 3. 12 Analysis ofthe above mentioned thresholds As with the positive rights described in nos. 15-20, we can observe several thresholds before a minority shareholder obta ins the negative right to block a decision desired by the majority. However, because the exercise of the aforementioned negative right is made dependent on the size of the stake of the majority, it is unnecessary for minority shareholders to combine their holdings before being able to exercise their rights. Analogous to the positive minority rights, the allocation of negative minority rights either on an individual or on an aggregate level is not elaborately thought-out nd seems to be more or less random. It is interesting to note that Dutch company law does not prescribe any qua lified majorities for two important decisions within a company. These are the amendment of the articles(section 2: 231(121)and the winding up of the company(sections 2: 19-21 ). However, in practice, many articles of assocation conta in prov isions that prescribe a qualified majority for amendment of certain, or in some cases all, sections of the articles The principle of equality 4.1 Relation to reasonableness and fairness
TIMMERMAN/DOORMAN 10 the meeting. There is no corresponding section for the BV, mainly due to the fact that this provision serves to protect the shareholders not present at the meeting. The underlying view was that shareholders in a BV have closer links with the affairs of the company and that they will sooner appear at a meeting should they disagree with a proposed resolution. Section 2:330 This section contains a provision concerning the majority required for a legal merger. Section 2:334ee Analogous to the legal merger, in the case of a legal division of a company, a resolution to divide an NV or a BV requires 2/3 of the votes cast should less than half of the issued capital be represented at the general meeting of shareholders. 3.111/3 of the votes cast (blocking power when the minority group possesses more than 2/3 of the votes cast). Section 2:243(133) subsection 2 It seems strange to discuss a provision that requires 2/3 of the votes cast and also represents at least 50% of the issued capital as a right belonging to a minority. However, if we define minority in a broad sense, not only with regard to percentages of the capital, but also with regard to the controlling position in the company (see no. 5), this right can be seen as a minority right. The articles may contain a provision that states that the appointment of a director by the general meeting of shareholders shall be made from a list of candidates containing the names of at least two candidates for each vacancy. The articles may grant this binding right of nomination to everyone. Subsection 2 then states that the general meeting may resolve by a resolution passed by a 2/3 majority representing more than half of the votes that such a nomination list shall not be binding. 3.12Analysis of the above mentioned thresholds As with the positive rights described in nos. 15-20, we can observe several thresholds before a minority shareholder obtains the negative right to block a decision desired by the majority. However, because the exercise of the aforementioned negative right is made dependent on the size of the stake of the majority, it is unnecessary for minority shareholders to combine their holdings before being able to exercise their rights. Analogous to the positive minority rights, the allocation of negative minority rights either on an individual or on an aggregate level is not elaborately thought-out and seems to be more or less random. It is interesting to note that Dutch company law does not prescribe any qualified majorities for two important decisions within a company. These are the amendment of the articles (section 2:231(121)) and the winding up of the company (sections 2:19-21). However, in practice, many articles of association contain provisions that prescribe a qualified majority for amendment of certain, or in some cases all, sections of the articles. 4 The principle of equality 4.1 Relation to reasonableness and fairness
