《中国金融市场 Chinese Financial Markets》补充阅读文献：global-shadow-banking-monitoring-report-2015

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Table of Contents Page Executive summary.................................................................................................................... 1 The Narrow Measure ................................................................................................. 2 The Broad Measure.................................................................................................... 2 Methodological improvements.................................................................................. 3 1. Introduction................................................................................................................ 6 2. A measure of shadow banking based on economic functions................................... 6 2.1 Economic functions approach.................................................................................... 7 2.2 Global perspective ..................................................................................................... 9 2.3 Cross-jurisdiction analysis....................................................................................... 11 2.4 Breakdown by economic functions ......................................................................... 14 3. Shadow banking risks and interconnectedness........................................................ 20 3.1 Shadow banking risks.............................................................................................. 20 3.2 Interconnectedness between banks and other financial intermediaries................... 26 4. Broader macro picture of all non-bank financial intermediation............................. 33 4.1 Insurance Companies and Pension Funds................................................................ 34 4.2 Other Financial Intermediaries (OFIs)..................................................................... 34 5. Credit and lending patterns...................................................................................... 42 5.1 Credit assets............................................................................................................. 42 5.2 Lending .................................................................................................................... 44 Annex 1: Exclusion of OFI entity types from shadow banking .............................................. 45 Annex 2: The non-bank financial sector in Ireland ................................................................. 48 Annex 3: FSB Regional Consultative Group for the Americas second report on shadow banking .................................................................................................................... 53 Annex 4: Share of total financial assets by jurisdiction .......................................................... 57

Executive summary The shadow banking system can broadly be described as credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside of the regular banking system. Intermediating credit through non-bank channels can have important advantages and contributes to the financing of the real economy, but such channels can also become a source of systemic risk, especially when they are structured to perform bank-like functions(e.g. maturity and liquidity transformation, and leverage)and when their interconnectedness with the regular banking system is strong Appropriate monitoring of shadow banking and the application of appropriate policy responses, where necessary, helps to mitigate the build-up of such systemic risks his report presents the results of the fifth annual monitoring exercise using data as of end 2014 for 26 jurisdictions, including Ireland for the first time, and the euro area as a whole, which together account for about 80% of global GDP and 90% of global financial system assets This years report introduces an enhancement to the monitoring methodology as a further step towards narrowing the focus to those parts of non-bank credit intermediation where shadow banking risks such as maturity transformation, liquidity transformation or leverage may occur A new activity-based"economic function" measure of shadow banking has been introduced, based on the high-level policy framework published by the FSB in August 2013 and described in an annex of last year's Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report. In order to ensure a certain degree of consistency in reporting, all authorities were guided to report non-bank credit intermediation if such activity was considered to give rise to shadow banking risks in at least some jurisdictions. As a result, the narrow measure presented in this year's report may overestimate the degree to which non-bank credit intermediation gives rise to systemic risks Since this was the first time that many jurisdictions took part in the assessment and this remains a work in progress, FSB members will continue to deepen their understanding of shadow banking and any potential risks through greater data availability and information- sharing. As such, the narrow measure of shadow banking may be subject to some degree of change in future reports I Some authorities and market participants prefer to use other terms such as"market-based financing "instead of"shadow banking". The use of the term"shadow banking"is not intended to cast a pejorative tone on this system of credit intermediation. However, the FSB is using the term"shadow banking" as it is the most commonly employed and, in particular, has been used in previous G20 communications 2Previousshadowbankingmonitoringreportscanbefoundathttp://www.fsborg/publications/r141030.pdf, ttp//www.fsborg/publications/r131114.pdf,http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r121118c.pdf,and http://www.fsborg/publications/r111027a.pdf 3 These figures, which apply to the 20+EA-group(see Footnote 4), were calculated from the statistical appendix of the IMF's Global Financial Stability Review, April 2015 4 Two samples are presented in this report. The first sample, which for ease of reference we denote the 26-group, is comprised of 26 reporting jurisdictions (including six individual euro area countries). The second sample, denoted 20+EA-group, comprises 20 individual non-euro area jurisdictions and the euro area aggregate. The 26-group is more ranular in terms of sector-level data and is therefore used to calculate the narrow measure of shadow banking based on economic functions(Section 2). The 20+EA-group has a wider scope in terms of jurisdiction coverage and is used to calculate the broad measure of non-bank financial intermediation(in most of Section 4) There were also cases in which authorities considered types of financial intermediation in their jurisdictions to be sufficiently distinct to warrant exclusion from the narrow measure. Annex I provides a review of the material exclusions made by authorities and authorities rationale for such exclusions

1 Executive summary The shadow banking system can broadly be described as credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside of the regular banking system.1 Intermediating credit through non-bank channels can have important advantages and contributes to the financing of the real economy, but such channels can also become a source of systemic risk, especially when they are structured to perform bank-like functions (e.g. maturity and liquidity transformation, and leverage) and when their interconnectedness with the regular banking system is strong. Appropriate monitoring of shadow banking and the application of appropriate policy responses, where necessary, helps to mitigate the build-up of such systemic risks. This report presents the results of the fifth annual monitoring exercise using data as of end- 2014 for 26 jurisdictions, including Ireland for the first time, and the euro area as a whole, which together account for about 80% of global GDP and 90% of global financial system assets.2,3,4 This year’s report introduces an enhancement to the monitoring methodology as a further step towards narrowing the focus to those parts of non-bank credit intermediation where shadow banking risks such as maturity transformation, liquidity transformation or leverage may occur. A new activity-based “economic function” measure of shadow banking has been introduced, based on the high-level policy framework published by the FSB in August 2013 and described in an annex of last year’s Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report. In order to ensure a certain degree of consistency in reporting, all authorities were guided to report non-bank credit intermediation if such activity was considered to give rise to shadow banking risks in at least some jurisdictions. 5 As a result, the narrow measure presented in this year’s report may overestimate the degree to which non-bank credit intermediation gives rise to systemic risks. Since this was the first time that many jurisdictions took part in the assessment and this remains a work in progress, FSB members will continue to deepen their understanding of shadow banking and any potential risks through greater data availability and informationsharing. As such, the narrow measure of shadow banking may be subject to some degree of change in future reports. 1 Some authorities and market participants prefer to use other terms such as “market-based financing” instead of “shadow banking”. The use of the term “shadow banking” is not intended to cast a pejorative tone on this system of credit intermediation. However, the FSB is using the term “shadow banking” as it is the most commonly employed and, in particular, has been used in previous G20 communications. 2 Previous shadow banking monitoring reports can be found at: http://www.fsb.org/publications/r_141030.pdf; http://www.fsb.org/publications/r_131114.pdf; http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_121118c.pdf, and http://www.fsb.org/publications/r_111027a.pdf. 3 These figures, which apply to the 20+EA-group (see Footnote 4), were calculated from the statistical appendix of the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Review, April 2015. 4 Two samples are presented in this report. The first sample, which for ease of reference we denote the 26-group, is comprised of 26 reporting jurisdictions (including six individual euro area countries). The second sample, denoted 20+EA-group, comprises 20 individual non-euro area jurisdictions and the euro area aggregate. The 26-group is more granular in terms of sector-level data and is therefore used to calculate the narrow measure of shadow banking based on economic functions (Section 2). The 20+EA-group has a wider scope in terms of jurisdiction coverage and is used to calculate the broad measure of non-bank financial intermediation (in most of Section 4). 5 There were also cases in which authorities considered types of financial intermediation in their jurisdictions to be sufficiently distinct to warrant exclusion from the narrow measure. Annex 1 provides a review of the material exclusions made by authorities and authorities’ rationale for such exclusions

The Narrow measure Based on a new methodology for assessing non-bank financial entities and activities by "economic functions"introduced this year, the narrow measure of global shadow banking that may pose financial stability risks amounted to $36 trillion in 2014 for the 26 participating jurisdictions. This is equivalent to 59% of GDP of participating jurisdictions, and 12% of financial system assets, and has grown moderately over the past several years More than 80% of global shadow banking assets reside in a subset of advanced economies in North America, Asia and northern europe The new classification by economic functions shows that credit intermediation associated with collective investment vehicles with features that make them susceptible to runs (e.g. money market funds(MMFs), hedge funds and other investment funds) represents 60% of the narrow measure of shadow banking. It has grown more than 10% on average over the past four years. By contrast, the level of securitisation-based credit intermediation -among the key contributors to the financial crisis-has fallen in recent years At the aggregate level, interconnectedness between the banking and the non-bank financial system, excluding those OFIs that are prudentially consolidated into banking groups, continues to decrease from its pre-crisis peak. However, in some jurisdictions, OFls' credit and funding exposures to banking systems are reported to be quite high and merit further assessment as to the extent of concentration of exposures and underlying risks The measurement of shadow banking risks- including leverage, liquidity and maturity transformation, and imperfect credit risk transfer- continues to face challenges in data availability. The FSB held a workshop for participating jurisdictions to assess economic classifications, associated risks and the availability of policy tools to address and mitigate material vulnerabilities to the financial system he broad measure An aggregate"MUNFI measure of the assets of other financial intermediaries(OFIs), pension funds and insurance companies grew by 9%to $137 trillion over the past year and now represents about 40% of total financial system assets in 20 jurisdictions and the euro area. In aggregate, the insurance company, pension fund and OFI sectors all grew in 2014, while banking system assets fell slightly in US dollar terms Based on assets of OFls alone, which have been the main focus of last years report, (i.e. excluding pension funds and insurance companies), non-bank financial intermediation of the 20 jurisdictions and the euro area rose $1. 6 trillion to $80 trillion in 2014. This growth was due to a combination of higher equity valuations and a substantial increase in non-bank credit intermediation, largely from capital markets The FSBs Monitoring Universe of Non-bank F Intermediation(MUNFD) includes OFIs, pension funds and insurance companies. The 20 jurisdictions and area cover a larger sample of jurisdictions than the 26 jurisdictions for which the narrow measure was cal see Footnote 4

2 The Narrow Measure • Based on a new methodology for assessing non-bank financial entities and activities by “economic functions” introduced this year, the narrow measure of global shadow banking that may pose financial stability risks amounted to $36 trillion in 2014 for the 26 participating jurisdictions. This is equivalent to 59% of GDP of participating jurisdictions, and 12% of financial system assets, and has grown moderately over the past several years. • More than 80% of global shadow banking assets reside in a subset of advanced economies in North America, Asia and northern Europe. • The new classification by economic functions shows that credit intermediation associated with collective investment vehicles with features that make them susceptible to runs (e.g. money market funds (MMFs), hedge funds and other investment funds) represents 60% of the narrow measure of shadow banking. It has grown more than 10% on average over the past four years. By contrast, the level of securitisation-based credit intermediation – among the key contributors to the financial crisis – has fallen in recent years. • At the aggregate level, interconnectedness between the banking and the non-bank financial system, excluding those OFIs that are prudentially consolidated into banking groups, continues to decrease from its pre-crisis peak. However, in some jurisdictions, OFIs’ credit and funding exposures to banking systems are reported to be quite high and merit further assessment as to the extent of concentration of exposures and underlying risks • The measurement of shadow banking risks – including leverage, liquidity and maturity transformation, and imperfect credit risk transfer – continues to face challenges in data availability. The FSB held a workshop for participating jurisdictions to assess economic classifications, associated risks and the availability of policy tools to address and mitigate material vulnerabilities to the financial system. The Broad Measure • An aggregate “MUNFI” measure of the assets of other financial intermediaries (OFIs), pension funds and insurance companies grew by 9% to $137 trillion over the past year, and now represents about 40% of total financial system assets in 20 jurisdictions and the euro area.6 In aggregate, the insurance company, pension fund and OFI sectors all grew in 2014, while banking system assets fell slightly in US dollar terms. • Based on assets of OFIs alone, which have been the main focus of last year’s report, (i.e. excluding pension funds and insurance companies), non-bank financial intermediation of the 20 jurisdictions and the euro area rose $1.6 trillion to $80 trillion in 2014. This growth was due to a combination of higher equity valuations and a substantial increase in non-bank credit intermediation, largely from capital markets. 6 The FSB’s Monitoring Universe of Non-bank Financial Intermediation (MUNFI) includes OFIs, pension funds and insurance companies. The 20 jurisdictions and the euro area cover a larger sample of jurisdictions than the 26 jurisdictions for which the narrow measure was calculated – see Footnote 4

While non-bank financial intermediation shrank somewhat immediately folle financial crisis, it has been rising over the past several years. OFI assets in the 20 jurisdictions and the euro area reached 128% of GDP in 2014, up 6 percentage points from 2013 and 15 percentage points from 2011. It is nearing the previous high-point of 130% prior to the financial crisi Emerging market economies(EMEs) showed the most rapid increases in OFI assets In 2014, 8 EMEs had OFI growth rates above 10%, including two that grew over 30% However, this rapid growth is generally from a relatively small base. While the non- bank financial system may contribute to financial deepening in these jurisdictions, careful monitoring of potential systemic risks caused by a rapid expansion of the non- bank sector is needed Among OFI sub-sectors that showed the most rapid growth in 2014 are trust companies, MMFS, and fixed income and other funds. Trust companies( mostly based in China) continued to experience growth of 26%, similar to the past several years Perhaps more surprisingly, MMFs experienced 20% growth in 2014 (largely driven by some euro area jurisdictions and China), following low or negative growth in the prior three-year period. Fixed income funds and other funds grew approximately 15%in 2014. It should be noted that hedge funds remain underestimated in the fSb,'s exercis due to the fact that a portion of international financial centres(IFCs), where a number of hedge funds are domiciled, are currently not within the scope of the exercise. The clusion of IFCs in the regional monitoring report by the FSBs Regional Consultative Group(rcG) for the Americas has helped to fill this gap(see Annex 3 More frequent updates of the IOSCO Hedge Fund Survey could provide important additions to the Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report. 7 Methodological improvements This year's report introduces several enhancements related to the methodologies to assess the size, activities and potential risks of shadow banking. As described in Section 2, the economic functions approach is based on the classification of non-bank financial entities into five economic functions through which non-bank credit intermediation may pose bank-like systemic risks to the financial system. Through this process, each jurisdiction identified and sought to remove non-bank entities that in its supervisory judgment, do not engage in credit intermediation and also those that are prudentially consolidated into banking groups These steps resulted in about a 71% reduction from the broad Monitoring Universe of Non- bank Financial Intermediation (MUNFD) estimate for the sample of 26 jurisdictions. The narrowing down approach through economic function classification uses more granular data and information provided by jurisdictions, including some degree of supervisory judgment to determine where shadow banking risks may arise. This year's report reflects the start of a 7 The publication of the 2015 IOSCO Hedge Fund Survey is expected by the end of 2015. The 2013 report is available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/loscopd42 In this regard, the economic function classification is similar to the approach used in the previous report which removed entities that did not engage in credit intermediation(e.g equity-only funds and equity REits) 9 Given that the approach allows for some degree of supervisory judgment to determine where shadow banking risks may arise, additional guidance on how to implement the approach will be developed to further enhance the consistency of

3 • While non-bank financial intermediation shrank somewhat immediately following the financial crisis, it has been rising over the past several years. OFI assets in the 20 jurisdictions and the euro area reached 128% of GDP in 2014, up 6 percentage points from 2013 and 15 percentage points from 2011. It is nearing the previous high-point of 130% prior to the financial crisis. • Emerging market economies (EMEs) showed the most rapid increases in OFI assets. In 2014, 8 EMEs had OFI growth rates above 10%, including two that grew over 30%. However, this rapid growth is generally from a relatively small base. While the nonbank financial system may contribute to financial deepening in these jurisdictions, careful monitoring of potential systemic risks caused by a rapid expansion of the nonbank sector is needed. • Among OFI sub-sectors that showed the most rapid growth in 2014 are trust companies, MMFs, and fixed income and other funds. Trust companies (mostly based in China) continued to experience growth of 26%, similar to the past several years. Perhaps more surprisingly, MMFs experienced 20% growth in 2014 (largely driven by some euro area jurisdictions and China), following low or negative growth in the prior three-year period. Fixed income funds and other funds grew approximately 15% in 2014. It should be noted that hedge funds remain underestimated in the FSB’s exercise due to the fact that a portion of international financial centres (IFCs), where a number of hedge funds are domiciled, are currently not within the scope of the exercise. The inclusion of IFCs in the regional monitoring report by the FSB’s Regional Consultative Group (RCG) for the Americas has helped to fill this gap (see Annex 3). More frequent updates of the IOSCO Hedge Fund Survey could provide important additions to the Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report.7 Methodological improvements This year’s report introduces several enhancements related to the methodologies to assess the size, activities and potential risks of shadow banking. As described in Section 2, the economic functions approach is based on the classification of non-bank financial entities into five economic functions through which non-bank credit intermediation may pose bank-like systemic risks to the financial system8 . Through this process, each jurisdiction identified and sought to remove non-bank entities that in its supervisory judgment, do not engage in credit intermediation and also those that are prudentially consolidated into banking groups. These steps resulted in about a 71% reduction from the broad Monitoring Universe of Nonbank Financial Intermediation (MUNFI) estimate for the sample of 26 jurisdictions. The narrowing down approach through economic function classification uses more granular data and information provided by jurisdictions, including some degree of supervisory judgment to determine where shadow banking risks may arise. 9 This year’s report reflects the start of a 7 The publication of the 2015 IOSCO Hedge Fund Survey is expected by the end of 2015. The 2013 report is available at: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD427.pdf. 8 In this regard, the economic function classification is similar to the approach used in the previous report which removed entities that did not engage in credit intermediation (e.g. equity-only funds and equity REITs). 9 Given that the approach allows for some degree of supervisory judgment to determine where shadow banking risks may arise, additional guidance on how to implement the approach will be developed to further enhance the consistency of classification

process by which authorities' exclusion of entity types that they assess as not engaging in any of the defined economic functions has been subject to collective review by peer jurisdiction The exercise took a conservative approach of including entity types into the narrow measure for all jurisdictions if the activities associated with non-bank credit intermediation could give rise to shadow banking risks at least in some jurisdictions. This year's report also seeks to explain where jurisdiction-specific exclusions from the narrow measure have occurred, and classification (see Annex 1). To foster aligned approaches, the activity-based narrow measure remains a work in progress and is expected to deeper understanding of the shadow banking system e consistency in the assessments and improve over time with increased data availability, mor Building on the economic functions classification, Section 3 of this report introduces risk analyses as a further enhancement to the annual monitoring report. It describes ways in which particular entity types may engage in leverage, liquidity and maturity transformation, and imperfect credit risk transfer in each economic function. Moreover, aggregate risk metrics across particular entity types in different economic functions are presented, illustrating how levels of risk-taking, as reported by each jurisdiction, range widely. While data gaps hamper a more thorough quantitative assessment of shadow banking risks, a review of jurisdictions assessment of risks based on available data and supervisory judgment suggests relatively higher attention to liquidity and maturity transformation risks at the current conjuncture. With respect to these risks, FSB members noted current concerns about rising risks stemming the overestimation by investors of the degree of liquidity in fixed income markets as well as the growth of assets under management in funds that offer on-demand redemptions but invest in less liquid assets. In light of these concerns, it is important to ensure that any financial stability risks are properly understood Section 4 of the report provides an enhanced macro-mapping of the broad measure of non- bank financial intermediation. Monitoring the broad measure remains important to cast the net wide to capture emerging adaptations and innovations from which shadow banking risks may This year, the monitoring scope has been increased through the inclusion of insurers and ion funds in the broad mUNFI measure 3 in order to enable the introduction of the shadow banking measure based on economic functions. Size and growth trends of insurance companies, pension funds and OFIs are presented. The section also compares various factors including growth of banking and non-banking sectors to gdP to better understand relationships between economic and financial system developments Chinese authorities did ation of certain entity types as shadow banking. Thus, China's entity types are not reflected in this years econo ions. The report shows a narrow measure of Chinas shadow banking sector based on ofis that ar intermediation, consistent with the methodology that was utilised to derive the narrow measure in last years shadow banking monitoring report. Due to data limitations, some of the exhibits and results presented in Section 3 on shadow banking risks and interconnectedness, and Section 5 on credit and lending patterns, in particular, come from a subsample of jurisdictions and may therefore not be extrapolated to describe the entire sample of participating jurisdictions. These data trends should not be interpreted as definitive indicators of the degree of financial stability risks posed by these activities. More specifically, any conclusion from the data related to the subsample may not apply to all of the jurisdictions that ttp//www.fsborg/2015/03/fsb-plenary-meets-in-frankfurt-germa Although not part of MUNFl, data on insurance companies and pension funds has already been collected in last year monitoring exercise to capture some key insights into the broader composition of the financial system

4 process by which authorities’ exclusion of entity types that they assess as not engaging in any of the defined economic functions has been subject to collective review by peer jurisdictions. The exercise took a conservative approach of including entity types into the narrow measure for all jurisdictions if the activities associated with non-bank credit intermediation could give rise to shadow banking risks at least in some jurisdictions. This year’s report also seeks to explain where jurisdiction-specific exclusions from the narrow measure have occurred, and the rationale for such differences in classification (see Annex 1). To foster aligned approaches, the activity-based narrow measure remains a work in progress and is expected to improve over time with increased data availability, more consistency in the assessments and a deeper understanding of the shadow banking system.10 Building on the economic functions classification, Section 3 of this report introduces risk analyses as a further enhancement to the annual monitoring report.11 It describes ways in which particular entity types may engage in leverage, liquidity and maturity transformation, and imperfect credit risk transfer in each economic function. Moreover, aggregate risk metrics across particular entity types in different economic functions are presented, illustrating how levels of risk-taking, as reported by each jurisdiction, range widely. While data gaps hamper a more thorough quantitative assessment of shadow banking risks, a review of jurisdictions’ assessment of risks based on available data and supervisory judgment suggests relatively higher attention to liquidity and maturity transformation risks at the current conjuncture. With respect to these risks, FSB members noted current concerns about rising risks stemming from the overestimation by investors of the degree of liquidity in fixed income markets as well as the growth of assets under management in funds that offer on-demand redemptions but invest in less liquid assets.12 In light of these concerns, it is important to ensure that any financial stability risks are properly understood. Section 4 of the report provides an enhanced macro-mapping of the broad measure of nonbank financial intermediation. Monitoring the broad measure remains important to cast the net wide to capture emerging adaptations and innovations from which shadow banking risks may arise. This year, the monitoring scope has been increased through the inclusion of insurers and pension funds in the broad MUNFI measure, 13 in order to enable the introduction of the shadow banking measure based on economic functions. Size and growth trends of insurance companies, pension funds and OFIs are presented. The section also compares various factors including growth of banking and non-banking sectors to GDP to better understand relationships between economic and financial system developments. 10 Chinese authorities did not agree with the classification of certain entity types as shadow banking. Thus, China’s entity types are not reflected in this year’s economic functions. The report shows a narrow measure of China’s shadow banking sector based on OFIs that are involved in credit intermediation, consistent with the methodology that was utilised to derive the narrow measure in last year’s shadow banking monitoring report. 11 Due to data limitations, some of the exhibits and results presented in Section 3 on shadow banking risks and interconnectedness, and Section 5 on credit and lending patterns, in particular, come from a subsample of jurisdictions and may therefore not be extrapolated to describe the entire sample of participating jurisdictions. These data trends should not be interpreted as definitive indicators of the degree of financial stability risks posed by these activities. More specifically, any conclusion from the data related to the subsample may not apply to all of the jurisdictions that participated in this report. 12 See the FSB Plenary press release: http://www.fsb.org/2015/03/fsb-plenary-meets-in-frankfurt-germany/. 13 Although not part of MUNFI, data on insurance companies and pension funds has already been collected in last year’s monitoring exercise to capture some key insights into the broader composition of the financial system

Data collection was expanded to include credit assets and lending of selected categories of financial entities. Section 5 analyses non-bank lending and credit intermediation trends to assess the sources and extent of incremental credit to the economy This years report also includes a summary of the second regional study on shadow banking d by the rcg for the americas and a country case study from Ireland of its shadow banking system Going forward the monitoring exercise will continue to benefit from further improvement and thorough follow-up by jurisdictions to address identified data gaps and reporting inconsistencies. In many jurisdictions, additional improvements in data availabilit granularity will be essential for authorities to be able to adequately capture the magnitude and nature of risks in the shadow banking system. In particular, jurisdictions that lack official Flow of Fund statistics are encouraged to develop them. 4 Jurisdictions are also encouraged devote additional resources to the development of more granular data on interconnectedness between the banking and the shadow banking system, and to the development of risk data Future monitoring reports will continue to cast the net wide by tracking the MUNFi estimate of all non-bank financial intermediation, in addition to further improving the narrow measure of shadow banking. The implementation of policy recommendations to address financial stability risks in securities financing transactions, in particular the global securities financing data collection initiative by the FSB, will also improve the coverage and granularity of the monitoring exercise. In this regard, the FSB will look to expand the data collection in future monitoring exercises to include outstanding securities finance transactions. Further encouragement of RCGs to undertake similar monitoring exercises and greater coordination with such regional monitoring initiatives will also be explored 14 Those that have large residuals for the OFI or other financial sector in the Flow of Funds reporting are also encouraged to FSB: Standards and Processes for Global Securities Financing Data Collection and aggregation, Consultative document. 13nOvember2014,seehttp://w tent/uploads/Gl T-Data-Standards-C Document. pdf

5 Data collection was expanded to include credit assets and lending of selected categories of financial entities. Section 5 analyses non-bank lending and credit intermediation trends to assess the sources and extent of incremental credit to the economy. This year’s report also includes a summary of the second regional study on shadow banking prepared by the RCG for the Americas and a country case study from Ireland of its shadow banking system. Going forward, the monitoring exercise will continue to benefit from further improvement and thorough follow-up by jurisdictions to address identified data gaps and reporting inconsistencies. In many jurisdictions, additional improvements in data availability and granularity will be essential for authorities to be able to adequately capture the magnitude and nature of risks in the shadow banking system. In particular, jurisdictions that lack official Flow of Fund statistics are encouraged to develop them. 14 Jurisdictions are also encouraged to devote additional resources to the development of more granular data on interconnectedness between the banking and the shadow banking system, and to the development of risk data. Future monitoring reports will continue to cast the net wide by tracking the MUNFI estimate of all non-bank financial intermediation, in addition to further improving the narrow measure of shadow banking. The implementation of policy recommendations to address financial stability risks in securities financing transactions, in particular the global securities financing data collection initiative by the FSB,15 will also improve the coverage and granularity of the monitoring exercise. In this regard, the FSB will look to expand the data collection in future monitoring exercises to include outstanding securities finance transactions. Further encouragement of RCGs to undertake similar monitoring exercises and greater coordination with such regional monitoring initiatives will also be explored. 14 Those that have large residuals for the OFI or other financial sector in the Flow of Funds reporting are also encouraged to improve granularity. 15 FSB: Standards and Processes for Global Securities Financing Data Collection and Aggregation, Consultative Document, 13 November 2014, see: http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Global-SFT-Data-Standards-ConsultativeDocument.pdf

Introduction The comprehensive monitoring of the size, trends, risks and adaptations of shadow banking on a global scale is an important element in strengthening the oversight of this sector and of ultimately transforming shadow banking into resilient market-based financing. To this end the FSB coordinates an annual exercise of data collection, aggregation, and analysis of global trends and risks in the shadow banking system. This report is the fifth annual exercise by the FSB to identify the magnitude of and changes in the global shadow banking system, in other words the system of"credit intermediation involving entities and activities fully or partly outside the regular banking system'. The 2015 monitoring exercise covers 26 jurisdictions, 7 including Ireland for the first time and the euro area as a whole. The exercise may be expanded to include additional jurisdictions in future. It uses annual data through the end of 2014 provided by national jurisdictions for the 2015 exercise based on the balance sheets of the financial system, as recorded in national financial accounts (e.g."Flow of Funds"), and also contains other supervisory data and private sector data sources. A network of representatives from participating jurisdictions was established to coordinate the shadow banking data collection Section 2 of this report introduces a new measure of shadow banking based on economic functions (or activities), which builds on the FSBs high-level Policy Framework for Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Entities(hereafter the Policy Framework) developed by the FSB in 2013. 8 Section 3 provides an assessment of inherent in the activities of shadow banking entities and also considers risks arising from the interconnectedness between banks and Other Financial Intermediaries(OFIs). OFIs comprise all financial intermediaries that are not classified as banks, insurance companies, pension unds, public financial institutions, central banks, or financial auxiliaries. Section 4 presents a broader perspective by looking at the size and trends of all non-bank financial intermediation This broader"macro-mapping" has been the focus of previous years'exercises and is updated in this report to include data through the end of 2014. Finally, Section 5 examines new data collected on credit intermediation undertaken by entities within the financial system to assess potential shifts in the providers of credit to the economy 2. A measure of shadow banking based on economic functions For the first time, this year's report offers an assessment of shadow banking across the major financial systems based on economic functions(or activities ). The approach is based on the classification of non-bank financial entities into five economic functions. each of which 16 FSB: Transforming Shadow Banking into Resilient Market-based Financing, an Overview of Progress and a roadmap for2015,14November2014,seehttp://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r121118.pdf 17 These are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland United States, and United Kingdom. While the scope of the report has been extended compared to previous years, there are other jurisdictions with significant shadow banking activities which are not, as yet, directly participating in the shadow banking monitoring exercise FSB: Policy Framework for Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Entities, 29 August 2013, se http://www.fsborg/wp-content/uploads/r130829c.pdf

6 1. Introduction The comprehensive monitoring of the size, trends, risks and adaptations of shadow banking on a global scale is an important element in strengthening the oversight of this sector and of ultimately transforming shadow banking into resilient market-based financing. To this end, the FSB coordinates an annual exercise of data collection, aggregation, and analysis of global trends and risks in the shadow banking system. This report is the fifth annual exercise by the FSB to identify the magnitude of and changes in the global shadow banking system, in other words the system of “credit intermediation involving entities and activities fully or partly outside the regular banking system”.16 The 2015 monitoring exercise covers 26 jurisdictions, 17 including Ireland for the first time, and the euro area as a whole. The exercise may be expanded to include additional jurisdictions in future. It uses annual data through the end of 2014 provided by national jurisdictions for the 2015 exercise based on the balance sheets of the financial system, as recorded in national financial accounts (e.g. “Flow of Funds”), and also contains other supervisory data and private sector data sources. A network of representatives from participating jurisdictions was established to coordinate the shadow banking data collection. Section 2 of this report introduces a new measure of shadow banking based on economic functions (or activities), which builds on the FSB’s high-level Policy Framework for Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Entities (hereafter the Policy Framework) developed by the FSB in 2013. 18 Section 3 provides an assessment of the risks inherent in the activities of shadow banking entities and also considers risks arising from the interconnectedness between banks and Other Financial Intermediaries (OFIs). OFIs comprise all financial intermediaries that are not classified as banks, insurance companies, pension funds, public financial institutions, central banks, or financial auxiliaries. Section 4 presents a broader perspective by looking at the size and trends of all non-bank financial intermediation. This broader “macro-mapping” has been the focus of previous years’ exercises and is updated in this report to include data through the end of 2014. Finally, Section 5 examines new data collected on credit intermediation undertaken by entities within the financial system to assess potential shifts in the providers of credit to the economy. 2. A measure of shadow banking based on economic functions For the first time, this year’s report offers an assessment of shadow banking across the major financial systems based on economic functions (or activities). The approach is based on the classification of non-bank financial entities into five economic functions, each of which 16 FSB: Transforming Shadow Banking into Resilient Market-based Financing, an Overview of Progress and a Roadmap for 2015, 14 November 2014, see: http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_121118.pdf. 17 These are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, and United Kingdom. While the scope of the report has been extended compared to previous years, there are other jurisdictions with significant shadow banking activities which are not, as yet, directly participating in the shadow banking monitoring exercise. 18 FSB: Policy Framework for Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Entities, 29 August 2013, see: http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130829c.pdf

involves non-bank credit intermediation that may pose shadow banking risks (e.g maturity/liquidity transformation and leverage The resulting measure of shadow banking, by establishing the principal activity of different shadow bank entities, takes the FSB's efforts to monitor the global shadow banking system step further towards identifying the subset of non-bank credit intermediation involved shadow banking risks that may raise financial stability concerns and where potential policy responses may be needed. 19 The addition of the economic function(activity )-based approach to monitoring shadow banking accomplishes two goals. First, it allows policy makers to better focus on the activities of shadow banking entities and on the potential risks they might pose. Second, it allows for a more accurate refinement of the shadow banking measure through the additional exclusion of non-bank financial entities that are not involved in significant maturity/liquidity transformation or leverage, and are not typically part of a credit intermediation chain. The implementation of this approach, however, is an ambitious endeavour which will take time to fully realise, with improvements and consistency also being achieved as authorities learn from collective information-sharing The measure of shadow banking based on economic functions differs from that reported in previous reports in several ways. Measures of shadow banking presented in previous reports were based on the exclusion from Ofis of assets related to self-securitisation assets of ofis prudentially consolidated into a banking group, and entities not directly involved in credit intermediation. This year's narrowing down methodology is more comprehensive and based on the economic functions outlined in the FSBs Policy Framework(see Box 1). Therefore this year's narrow shadow banking results are not comparable to results provided in previous plications 2.1 Economic functions approach The five economic functions are set out in the FSBs Policy Framework, published in August 2013. The framework is designed to allow authorities to detect and assess the sources of financial stability risks from shadow banking in the non-bank financial space and to apply appropriate policy measures to mitigate these risks One element of the FSB's Policy Framework is the assessment of non-bank financial entities based on economic functions. It takes into account home authorities'assessment of potential sources of shadow banking risks in non-bank financial entities in their jurisdiction from a financial stability perspective, by either classifying these entities with reference to five economic functions or excluding the entity based on the assessment that it does not pose shadow bank-like risks. Exhibit 1 sets out these five economic functions. Section 3 summarises the ways in which each economic function gives rise to shadow banking risks. 20 19 Through the FSB's shadow banking information-sharing exercise, authorities from a number of juris have noted that some entity-types classified as shadow banking are highly regulated through a range of policy tools available to address and mitigate shadow banking risks. See the FSBs Policy Framework for an assessment of the FSBs policy toolkittomitigateshadowbankingrisks(availableathttp://www.fsborg/wp-content/uploads/r13082 the availability, use and efficacy of such tools may range significantly across jurisdictions. Therefore, to ensure conservatism and consistency of reporting, these entity types were included in shadow banking 20 See the FSBs Policy Framework for further details on the five economic functions 7

7 involves non-bank credit intermediation that may pose shadow banking risks (e.g. maturity/liquidity transformation and leverage). The resulting measure of shadow banking, by establishing the principal activity of different shadow bank entities, takes the FSB’s efforts to monitor the global shadow banking system a step further towards identifying the subset of non-bank credit intermediation involved in shadow banking risks that may raise financial stability concerns and where potential policy responses may be needed. 19 The addition of the economic function (activity)-based approach to monitoring shadow banking accomplishes two goals. First, it allows policy makers to better focus on the activities of shadow banking entities and on the potential risks they might pose. Second, it allows for a more accurate refinement of the shadow banking measure through the additional exclusion of non-bank financial entities that are not involved in significant maturity/liquidity transformation or leverage, and are not typically part of a credit intermediation chain. The implementation of this approach, however, is an ambitious endeavour which will take time to fully realise, with improvements and consistency also being achieved as authorities learn from collective information-sharing. The measure of shadow banking based on economic functions differs from that reported in previous reports in several ways. Measures of shadow banking presented in previous reports were based on the exclusion from OFIs of assets related to self-securitisation, assets of OFIs prudentially consolidated into a banking group, and entities not directly involved in credit intermediation. This year’s narrowing down methodology is more comprehensive and based on the economic functions outlined in the FSB’s Policy Framework (see Box 1). Therefore, this year’s narrow shadow banking results are not comparable to results provided in previous publications. 2.1 Economic functions approach The five economic functions are set out in the FSB’s Policy Framework, published in August 2013. The framework is designed to allow authorities to detect and assess the sources of financial stability risks from shadow banking in the non-bank financial space and to apply appropriate policy measures to mitigate these risks. One element of the FSB’s Policy Framework is the assessment of non-bank financial entities based on economic functions. It takes into account home authorities’ assessment of potential sources of shadow banking risks in non-bank financial entities in their jurisdiction from a financial stability perspective, by either classifying these entities with reference to five economic functions or excluding the entity based on the assessment that it does not pose shadow bank-like risks. Exhibit 1 sets out these five economic functions. Section 3 summarises the ways in which each economic function gives rise to shadow banking risks.20 19 Through the FSB’s shadow banking information-sharing exercise, authorities from a number of jurisdictions have noted that some entity-types classified as shadow banking are highly regulated through a range of policy tools available to address and mitigate shadow banking risks. See the FSB’s Policy Framework for an assessment of the FSB’s policy toolkit to mitigate shadow banking risks (available at: http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130829c.pdf). However, the availability, use and efficacy of such tools may range significantly across jurisdictions. Therefore, to ensure conservatism and consistency of reporting, these entity types were included in shadow banking. 20 See the FSB’s Policy Framework for further details on the five economic functions

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