704 GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN 200:Fulcher Hammer:Walther.200)From the pe spective of the APE model e coud rgue that when conting eceonpopoitadngo s were pre This in uth and itin-group favortisn vord r ings and the of the n (cf.Rubin Hewstone 998).Even though this interpre vords and elderly was repeatedl her instance of indirect influences on explicit a han sin evaluative judgments.An illustrativ ale for thi s a study by Ri d Nussbaum (20).In ttitudes.Drawing on the Am awarenes al ev tion.April 5.4).in implicit EC with conting awar ess may still change implici even wher deological p cted when tochang e represen Ame evaluative iudgments about af mplie I by arch ibili can America o y had h uce participants'implicit prejudice affected by a direct por an indireet infl ving on the ciative evaluations,with neith APE mode one coul ue that the p e Figure 4 eviously encountered pants might have reiected their associative evaluations of africar Americans as a valid basis for an evaluative judgment.Such xmple for this pattem is again found in search on EC.which has shown that conditioning effects onative judgments. This interpretation implies that (a) explicit in￾group favoritism in minimal group settings should be mediated by implicit in-group favoritism and (b) in-group favoritism should be stronger for participants with high rather than low implicit self￾esteem (cf. Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Even though this interpre￾tation of in-group favoritism is obviously post hoc, future research may provide empirical support for this assumption.7 Another instance of indirect influences on explicit attitudes arises when changes in pattern activation lead to corresponding changes in evaluative judgments. An illustrative example for this case is a study by Richeson and Nussbaum (2004). In their study, participants were presented with messages advocating either a color-blind or a multicultural approach to reducing interethnic tension. Participants evaluated African Americans less negatively after reading a multicultural proposal than after reading a color￾blind proposal. This effect emerged for both explicit and implicit attitudes, with changes in explicit attitudes being fully mediated by changes in implicit attitudes (J. A. Richeson, personal communi￾cation, April 5, 2004). In contrast, changes in implicit attitudes were not mediated by explicit attitudes, as suggested by a signif￾icant effect on implicit attitudes after the researchers controlled for explicit attitudes (J. A. Richeson, personal communication, April 5, 2004). Drawing on the APE model, one could argue that the two ideological perspectives activated different patterns of the preex￾isting associative representation of African Americans. These re￾sulting associative evaluations, in turn, served as a basis for participants’ evaluative judgments about African Americans. Most important, the two messages did not imply different evaluations of African Americans, which could have led to a direct influence on evaluative judgments. In contrast, it seems that the two ideological approaches were associated with different construals of African Americans on the associative level, which, in turn, affected par￾ticipants’ evaluative judgments. Case 2. The second case involves a direct influence on asso￾ciative evaluations, with neither a direct nor an indirect influence on evaluative judgments (see Figure 4). This case implies a change in implicit but not explicit attitudes, with the two being generally uncorrelated. According to the APE model, such patterns should emerge when (a) a given factor leads to a change in pattern activation or associative structure and, additionally, (b) other rel￾evant propositions lead to a rejection of associative evaluations as a valid basis for an evaluative judgment. An illustrative example for this pattern is again found in re￾search on EC, which has shown that conditioning effects on evaluative judgments are often reduced when participants become aware of the contingency between CS und US (De Houwer et al., 2001; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001; Walther, 2002). From the per￾spective of the APE model, one could argue that contingency awareness reduces participants’ trust in the validity of their asso￾ciative evaluations, such that actual changes in associative struc￾ture are not reflected in evaluative judgments. However, associa￾tive evaluations may still be influenced by EC manipulations, even when contingency awareness undermines corresponding effects for evaluative judgments. In other words, even when contingency awareness attenuates the indirect effect of EC on explicit attitudes, implicit attitudes may nevertheless show a direct influence of EC manipulations. Preliminary evidence for this assumption comes from Karpinski and Hilton (2001). In their study, participants were presented with pairings of the words youth and elderly (CS) with positive and negative words (US). Participants’ task was to memorize the specific word pairings and the frequency of their occurrence. Results showed that participants exhibited a lower level of implicit prejudice against older adults when youth was repeatedly paired with negative words and elderly was repeatedly paired with pos￾itive words. However, participants exhibited a higher level of implicit prejudice against older people when youth was repeatedly paired with positive words and elderly was repeatedly paired with negative words. It is interesting to note that explicit attitudes were neither affected by conditioning manipulations nor significantly related to implicit attitudes. Drawing on the considerations out￾lined above, it seems that memorization instructions made partic￾ipants highly aware of the particular contingencies implied by the word pairings, which, in turn, reduced participants’ trust in the validity of their associative evaluations. However, because contin￾gency awareness may only undermine the influence of associative evaluations on propositional evaluations, the direct influence of EC on associative evaluations may still be unaffected. In other words, EC with contingency awareness may still change implicit attitudes even when explicit attitudes are unaffected. Asymmetrical influences of this sort would, of course, also be expected when external stimuli lead to changes in pattern activa￾tion and perceivers reject their associative evaluations as a valid basis for an evaluative judgment. Examples of such effects are implied by research on exemplar accessibility. As previously noted, Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) have shown that implicit prejudice against African Americans decreased when participants previously had been presented with pictures of admired Black and disliked White individuals. Similarly, Lowery et al. (2001) found that the mere presence of an African American experimenter reduced White participants’ implicit prejudice against African Americans. In both studies, explicit evaluations of African Amer￾icans were unaffected by accessible exemplars. Drawing on the APE model, one could argue that the previously encountered exemplars led to a change in pattern activation. However, partic￾ipants might have rejected their associative evaluations of African Americans as a valid basis for an evaluative judgment. Such 7 Note that this interpretation explains in-group favoritism but not out￾group derogation (Brewer, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002). In particular, the proposed transfer of associative self-evaluations to the in-group should influence associative evaluations of the in-group but not the out-group. Figure 3. Case 1: Indirect influence on propositional reasoning mediated by a direct influence on associative evaluations, leading to corresponding changes in explicit and implicit attitudes. Solid arrows reflect a causal influence, whereas open arrows reflect a lack of influence. 704 GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN