一、问题:有时候,拥有私人信息的一方有积极性通过一定的行动向另一方传递自己的私人信息,但有时候他们没有积极性或没有有效的办法传递自己的私人信息; 二、机制设计没有私人信息的一方通过设计不同的分配方案使得有私人信息的一方通过自我选择揭示自己的私人信息

一、从腐败谈起; 二、委托-代理模型; 三、激励机制的设计; 四、大学教员的激励; 五、政府官员的激励; 六、团队中的所有权激励

一、信息不对称可能导致潜在的交易不能进行; 二、但在许多情况下,为了获得交易带来的收益,拥有私人信息的一方会主动揭示自己的私人信息; 三、信号传递拥有私人信息的一方通过一定的行为选择来告诉没有私人信息的一方自己的真实类型

Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics

一、Bargaining问题的普遍性 二、所有讨价还价的共同之处

NOTE: On the“ ethics” of problem sets Some of the theoretical exercise I will assign are actually well-known results; in other cases you may be able to find the answer in the literature. This is certainly the case for the current My position on this issue is that, basically, if you look up the answer somewhere it's your problem. After all, you can buy answer keys to most textbooks. The fact is, you will not have access to such, ehm, supporting material when you take your generals, or, in a more

一、儒家和法家都以建立和维持社会秩序为目的,区别只在于他们对于社会秩序的看法和达到这种理想的方法; 二、礼与法; 三、德与刑;

一、引言; 二、社会规范与法律的同异; 三、社会规范和法律的功能; 四、人们为什么遵守社会规范? 五、为什么需要法律? 六、法律的局限;

Dept. of Electrical Computer Engineering OOCL Transportation Co Dept, of Economics University of Ilinois at Urbana-Champaign 300 Central Ave Urbana IL 6180 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Mountain view, CA 94043 Champaign, IL 61820 Abstract We provide a brief review of the EWPP operation [1].The Pool dispatcher is charged with determining on a daily basis We formulate a general framework of a competitive electric- the schedule for the so-called availability declaration period ity generation supply market(CEM, embodying the salient (ADP),a 39-bour

第一章公共经济学的基础 第一节公共经济学的方法论基础 一、实证分析与规范分析 二、归纳法与演绎法 三、博弈论方法 四、成本与收益分析法 第二节公共经济学的理论基础