1. Asymmetric auctions Consider an interdependent-values auction with two bidders, each of whom observes an i.i.d uniform signal s; E [ 0, 1]. Bidder i' s valuation for the object is equal to

博弈论案例一一田忌赛马 远方灰尘尽处,徒现城池一座,遥望城 门,大大的旗帜上绣着一个字,“齐”。大 摇大摆入得城门,却浑然不见一人,诺大个 都城,犹如无人之境。好不容易寻得个老者, 细细打听之下,方知上至皇亲国戚、达官贵 人,下至往来商贾、平民布衣皆往校场而去。 盖大将军田忌与齐王以千金为赌,三场赛马 决胜负。虽田忌此前惯与大王赛马,但未有 胜绩,且此回大将军一掷千金,故引得诸班 人等空城而

一、民主的内涵 二、民主的类型 三、民主的博弈 四、民主的困境

本文是美国政治学家、公共行政学家和新制度主义政治经济学家埃莉 诺·奥斯特罗姆和其合作者有关水资源问题研究的重要论文之一。该文的特色 是运用博弈模型和实证研究方法,以灌溉系统为例,探讨在公共池塘资源使用 者相互不对称条件下,何种自主治理制度能够使公共池塘资源能够得以持续开 发和发展。作者最后指出,外部力量的干预,往往因为改变了使用者之间的博 弈地位,以及由于其缺乏地方知识,难以设计适用的制度规则,而使得情形更 糟。中国是一个严重缺水的国家,灌溉系统往往由于缺乏适当的制度结构而难 以可持续地得以开发和发展。许多地方都在为争水而械斗,而这都与分水缺乏 合理且有效的制度规则结构相关;

Contents Dominant strategy Nash equilibrium Prisoner's' dilemma and repeated games Multiple equilibria and sequential games Pure and mixed strategies

14,1采购与供应链的关系 14.1.1传统采购模式 1.传统的采购过程是典型的非信息对称的 博弈过程 2.质量控制不及时 3.供需双方的合作关系短暂 4.响应用户需求的能力迟钝

《博弈论》（英文版） ps5 Due Tuesday, November

1. Machines Extend Proposition 151. 1(the Perfect Folk Theorem with discounting)to arbitrary mixtures of payoff profiles of the original game G=(N, (Ai, lilieN Allow for both rational and real weights on the set of profiles u(a): aE A]; note that the statement of the result will involve an approximation of the payoff profile Construct a machine that implements the strategies in your proof

Player i is rational\;R=nieN Ri. Also, Bi(E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and B(E)=neN Bi(E). This is as in Lecture 7. Let me introduce the following notation for iterated mutual certainty: B()(E)=E B()(E)=B(B-I)(E)). Then the definition of Bk in Lecture 7 can be rewritten as Bk

Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all\strategically relevant\information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be uspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct