Different Sort of Personal Identity:\Ethical\ Identity . Personal Identity: \Ethical\v. \Metaphysical\questions The previous lectures and readings on personal identity were primarily concerned with the metaphysics of personal identity. Question of diachronic identity/unity: Confronted with an individual X at one time and Y at another, what would make it the case that X and Y are (or are parts of) the same person? We've seen that the answer to this question may well depend on what sort of thing you think persons are: are persons bodies? Streams of consciousness?

24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger November 7, 2001 Freewill IlI: Libertarianism I. Recap: Compatibilism v. Incompatibilism Hard determinism is the view that determinis is true and that because of this freedom is an illusion. The libertarian agrees with the hard determinist that freewill is incompatible with determinism, but disagrees about which claim should be rejected. The libertarian holds that we have free will, but this is only because determinism is false-free acts occur and are undetermined. The hard determinist and the libertarian are both incompatibilists. Soft determinism, also known as compatibilism, maintains that determinism is true, but also that determinism is

October 22, 2001 Personal IdentityⅢ . Review soul criterion and body criterion Soul criterion: x is the same person as y iff and y have the same soul. Problems: i)There is no way to establish body-soul correlations; and no way to establish personality correlations. So soul criterion doesn't make sense of our practices of recognizing and identifying people ii)We have no special access to souls, so even in our own case we can't be sure it's the same soul \inside\ us whenever we are conscious. ii) The problem of identity is \pushed back\: what is it for person-stage x to have the same soul as person-stage y? What makes for sameness of souls? Body criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same living human body

al Identity ll Problem of synchronic identity for persons: under what conditions are two simultaneous person-events events in the life of the same person? Problem of diachronic identity for persons under what conditions are two person-stages stages in the life of a single person. In particular, what makes a particular person-stage a continuation of me as I am right now? Background desiderata: an account of personal identity should allow for the possibility of anticipation and memory, i.e., of individual psychological connections between different person stages. It should also allow us to justify our practices of

The Problem of Induction Although James and Clifford disagree about the reasonableness of belief in a special class of propositions(when they constitute a genuine choice for us), they agree that in the majority of cases empirical investigation and the scientific pursuit of evidence is at least a, if not the proper way to proceed in forming beliefs. It

1. The\Wager\and the Practical Rationality Principle Practical Rationality Principle: The practically rational thing to do is the thing with the highest expected value(or utility \) Version A: Do the thing with higher expected value than all its competitors --In the case of a tie, neither action/belief is permitted Version B: Find the actions with highest expected value and perform whichever of them you like --In the case of a tie, Theism is practically rational. Just like choosing pie over cake 2. Evidentialism(Clifford)

September 12, 2001 The Problem of Evil Last time we considered the ontological argument for the existence of God. If the argument is cogent, then we have reason to be rational theists, i.e., to maintain that there are justifying reasons for belief in God's existence. Today we're going to consider an argument for atheism which purports to show that theism is incoherent, i.e., that theism entails a contradiction. If the argument works, then the only option available to the theist would be irrational theism: belief in God's existence in spite of justifying reasons supporting

1.The acquisition-learning distinction 2. The input hypothesis 3.The monitor hypothesis 4. The affective Filter hypothesis 5.The natural order hypothesis

本课程是专为北大中国经济研究中心研究生设计的短期选修课,欢迎中心经 济学博士、硕士、双学位以及北大其他院系的研究生和本科高年级学生选修。比较制度分 析代表了近些年国际上比较经济学研究领域中的最新理论发展。本课程将把任课教师近些 年在比较经济学领域中所做的探索做一些总结性的理论介绍。这是一门相对思辨的理论经 济学课程,将涉及到哲学、法学、伦理学、文化人类学和语言学等多学科知识

自然语言是人与人交流思想的工具，程序语言是人和计算机之间传达信息的工具。为了描述程序语言，本章将引进有关形式语言的基本概念。文法是程序语言的生成系统，自动机是程序语言的识别系统，用文法来精确定义一个语言，然后根据这个文法构造识别这个语言的自动机，因此文法对程序语言和编译程序的构造来说意义重大。随着计算机的发展，形式语言学发展很快。N.Chomsky将文法分成四类，程序语言的词法可用正规文法描述，语法可用上下文无关文法描述，语义则要借助于上下文有关文法来描述。因此我们的注意力是针对这几类文法，特别是上下文无关文法