1. Game Theory Multiperson Decision Theory Zero-Sum games Marciano siniscalchi September 16, 1999 administrative stuff Class: Tue-Thu 10: 40-12: 1021, Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment The big picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses You will probably be familiar with the

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium On the other hand, it shows that essentially every individually rational payoff profile can

Introduction Nash equilibrium has undoubtedly proved to be the most influential idea in game theory. enabled fundamental breakthroughs in economics and the social sciences. Its development was a major intellectual achievement; what is perhaps more important, it Recent foundational research has emphasized the subtleties in the interpretation of Nash

Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first- and second-price auctions. I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2 The first-price auction may be inefficient even with private values Both examples I am going to show are due to Eric Maskin(to the best of my knowledge) The first point I wish to make is that, even in a private-values setting, asymmetries may

Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics

NOTE: On the“ ethics” of problem sets Some of the theoretical exercise I will assign are actually well-known results; in other cases you may be able to find the answer in the literature. This is certainly the case for the current My position on this issue is that, basically, if you look up the answer somewhere it's your problem. After all, you can buy answer keys to most textbooks. The fact is, you will not have access to such, ehm, supporting material when you take your generals, or, in a more

1. Information Processing Definition of Information processing All operations exerted to the information itself for its better utilization Information processing is necessary because most of the information in its original form may not be good for use. Thus information processing is the basis of later operations Two categories of information processing: 1)Shallow Level of Information Processing 2)Deeper level of Information Processing

BE. 410 Spring 2003-Lecture 3 Slides Images removed due to copyright considerations See Figures 1 and 2 in Liphardt, Jan, et al. \Reversible Unfolding of Single RNA Molecules

BE.410 Spring 2003-Lecture 20 Images removed due to copyright considerations The following articles and research were discussed in this lecture Rawicz, W. et al. \Effect of Chain Length and Unsaturation on Elasticity of Lipid Bilayers

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