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文档格式:PPT 文档大小:299.5KB 文档页数:31
西安电子科技大学:《微波技术》课程教学资源(PPT课件讲稿)第十四章 矩形波导中的简正波 Eigen Modes in Rectangular Waveguide
文档格式:PPT 文档大小:282.5KB 文档页数:37
这次课主要讲述矩形波导中TE10波。我们将先从波导一般解开始讲起
文档格式:PPT 文档大小:2.93MB 文档页数:26
Continuity Conditions at The Interface Potential Energy Forces on Conductors In The Presence Of Dielectrics Forces On Dielectrics Displacement Current Frequency and Temperature Dependence, Anisotropy
文档格式:PPT 文档大小:3.5MB 文档页数:27
Conduction of Electricity Ohm's Law Non-linear Resistors Resistors Connected Kirchhoff's Lawss Substitution Theorem Mesh Current
文档格式:PPT 文档大小:2.37MB 文档页数:24
The Total Current Density J The curl of b Maxwells equations Maxwell's equations in Integral Form
文档格式:PPT 文档大小:2.07MB 文档页数:18
Forces on a Wire Carrying a Current in a Magnetic Field Magnetic Pressure Magnetic Energy Denisity Magnetic Forces btwn Two Electric Currents Magnetic Forces Within an Isolated Circuit
文档格式:PPT 文档大小:2.69MB 文档页数:17
Motional Electromtance Faraday Induction Law for V B Fields Lenz' law Faraday Induction Law for Time- Dependenct B Flux Linkage E in Terms of and A
文档格式:PPT 文档大小:303KB 文档页数:15
Object: to describe the fieds generated by electric charges and currents Mathematical tools A field is a function describing a quantity at all points in space
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This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof); (2)to highlight the assumptions implicit in the conventional usage of the framework, and the possible departures; (3) to discuss its potential problems, as well as some solutions to the latter
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One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter. mine equilibrium behavior. For instance, consider the simple two-stage entry deter- rence game in which potential entrant decides whether to enter a market or stay out, and the incumbent decides whether to fight or acquiesce after the entrant's move
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