外研版（三起）（2012）小学英语四年级下册Module 7 Unit 1 I helped Mum.教案(6)

定理 3-1：对于固定信道，平均互信息 I(X;Y) 是信源概率分布 p(x)的∩型凸函 数。 定理 3-2：对于固定信源分布，平均互信息 I(X;Y)是信道传递概率 p(y|x)的∪型凸函 数。 定理 3-3：设离散信道的输入序列 X＝ (X1X2…XN)通过信道传输，接收到的随机序 列为 Y=( Y1Y2…YN)，而信道的转移概率为 p(y∣x)

Caution: Use this table only as a quick reference for tentative identification of residues found in samples analyzed by the most com￾monly used PAM I multiresidue methods. Always compare the residue to a standard chromatographed in your own gas chromatograph

Pesticide Analytical Manual Vol. I Transmittal No. 2000-1 (10/1999) Form FDA 2905a (6/92) PESTICIDE ANALYTICAL MANUAL VOLUME I 3rd Edition, 1994 Revised, September, 1996 Revised, October, 1997 Revised, October 1999 EDITORIAL STAFF

外研版（三起）（2012）小学英语四年级下册Module 7 Unit 1 I helped Mum.教案(2)

引理1: 设T和T是两个杨盘, 由置换r相联系, 即T=rT. 置换s作用于杨盘T上将T中任一位置(i,j)处的数字变 到sT中的(k,l)处, 则s=rsr–1作用在T上将T中位于(i,j) 处的数字变到sT中的(k,l)位置

By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium

一、 拟和优度检验 总体平方和、回归平方和与残差平方和 1、总体平方和：TSS= 2( ˆ )i i  y − y 大小反映 y 的变动度

上一章讨论了产品市场中的四方面的总支出水平如何决定经 济社会的总产出水平，而且假设了投资（i）是一个常数。 但市场经济社会中不但有产品市场，而且有货币市场，两个 市场还是相互影响，相互依存的；不但消费（c）是一个变 量，而且投资（i）也是一个变量

Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I