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I guess I have to come out to reply to those who concern with the nature rate of unemployment First, What is the natural rate of unemployment? It is assumed to be the unemployment rate at the steady state or equilibrium. Note that equilibrium here is not referred to the common
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By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium
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(Continued with question 1 in exercise for chapter 3). Suppose instead of given 2000 there is an investment function which takes the form Above, i is the interest rate. Meanwhile there is a demand function for money Md=1.2Y-20000i Assume that the monetary base is equal to 2000 while the required reserve ratio is 1 ). What is the equilibrium level of output Y and interest rate?
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When in 1920 I resumed my studies of theoretical physics which had long been interrupted by circumstances beyond my control, I was far from the idea that my studies would bring me several years later to receive such a higl and envied prize as that awarded by the Swedish Academy of Sciences each year to a scientist: the Nobel Prize for Physics. What at that time drew me towards theoretical physics was not the hope that such a high distinction
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Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I
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Recall the following definitions: in any model M=(Q, (Ti, ai, piie), Ri is the event Player i is rational\;R=nieN Ri. Also, Bi(E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and B(E)=neN Bi(E). This is as in Lecture
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These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first- and second-price auctions. I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2
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设混合气体由1,2,k种气体组成 m=m1+m2+m3+…+m;+…+m=>m i=1 第i种组元气体的质量成分:
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I Systems Microbiology(13 Lectures 7hece∥ as a we∥}- stirred boc/ nem/ca/ reactor Introduction 2 Chemical kinetics, Equilibrium binding, cooperativity L3 Lambda phage L4 Stability analysis L5-6 Genetic switches
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By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made
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