概述 肝细胞结构与功能的异质性(heterogeneity) 原因 不同部位的肝细胞获得的氧和营养物 质具有差异。 以终末微血管为中轴,将肝小叶中的肝细 胞分为三条带: I带(门管周带periportal zone) Ⅲ带(小叶中心带centrolobular zone) Ⅱ带(介于I带与Ⅲ带之间)

Conduction of Electricity Ohm's Law Non-linear Resistors Resistors Connected Kirchhoff's Lawss Substitution Theorem Mesh Current

The Total Current Density J The curl of b Maxwells equations Maxwell's equations in Integral Form

Forces on a Wire Carrying a Current in a Magnetic Field Magnetic Pressure Magnetic Energy Denisity Magnetic Forces btwn Two Electric Currents Magnetic Forces Within an Isolated Circuit

Motional Electromtance Faraday Induction Law for V B Fields Lenz' law Faraday Induction Law for Time- Dependenct B Flux Linkage E in Terms of and A

Object: to describe the fieds generated by electric charges and currents Mathematical tools A field is a function describing a quantity at all points in space

This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof); (2)to highlight the assumptions implicit in the conventional usage of the framework, and the possible departures; (3) to discuss its potential problems, as well as some solutions to the latter

One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter. mine equilibrium behavior. For instance, consider the simple two-stage entry deter- rence game in which potential entrant decides whether to enter a market or stay out, and the incumbent decides whether to fight or acquiesce after the entrant's move

Class: Tue-Thu 10: 40-12: 10 [?] Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment. The Big Picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses. You will probably be familiar with the notions of simultaneous us. extensive-form game, perfect vs. imperfect information, complete us. incomplete information, Nash

The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium brings both to the fore in a straightforward manner, and emphasizes their interrelation. From subgame perfection to sequential rationality