外研版（三起）（2012）小学英语四年级下册Module 5 Unit 1 I was two then.教案(3)

Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\to thethe- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e behavioral) characterization of rationalizability a review of the basic definitions For your convenience, I summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive

Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer to OR for details and definitions: I am following the textbook quite closely. of the game in which an incumbent faces a sequence of K (potential) entrants. It is clear that, in the subgame in which the last entrant gets a chance to play, the incumbent will

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made for payoff uncertainty

高等数学模拟试题(1) (一)填空题: 1.设f(x)处处连续,且f②=3,则1i) 2微分方程as的通解是() 3.已知f(x=1,则1i七

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium On the other hand, it shows that essentially every individually rational payoff profile can

Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I can add you to the list. You do not want to miss important announcements, do you? the course has a web page at http://www.princeton.edw

综合试题1 一、判别下列命题是否正确 1.如果行列式d=0那么它至少有一行元素全为零 2.如果含n个末知量的n个方程构成的线性方程组的系数行列式等于零,那么它有无穷多解. 3.如量向量组与向量组的秩相等,那么I~I 5.如果向量B可由向量组唯一线性表出,·则线性无关

2凸函数及其应用 凸函数定义及其等价形式: 设f(x)在区间I上有定义,若对任意x1、x2∈I,A∈[0,1]成立不等式:

一、由电路求响应 由S域等效电路 1.元件→域运算阻抗R,L,M,C→R,L,M、 sC信号→象函数i(t),u(t)→I(s),U(s)