The notion of subgame perfection is the cornerstone of the theory of extensive games. It embodies its key intuitions-and provides a vivid example of the difficulties inherent in such a theor But, above all, it has proved to be extremely profitable in a variety of applications. More- over, it has spawned a huge theoretical literature which has attempted(often successfully

ome of the theoretical exercise I will assign are actually well-known results; in other cases you may be able to find the answer in the literature. This is certainly the case for the current My position on this issue is that, basically, if you look up the answer somewhere it's your problem. After all, you can buy answer keys to most textbooks. The fact is, you will not

The short distance transports of nutrients There are two main steps nutrients translocation in plant after nutrients absorbed by the root. One is the centripetal transport from the rhizoplane through the cortex tissue of the roots towards the xylem vessels of the central cylinder. Another one is the vertical transport from from the root towards the leaves

Player i is rational\;R=nieN Ri. Also, Bi(E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and B(E)=neN Bi(E). This is as in Lecture 7. Let me introduce the following notation for iterated mutual certainty: B()(E)=E B()(E)=B(B-I)(E)). Then the definition of Bk in Lecture 7 can be rewritten as Bk

Recall the following definitions: in any model M=(Q, (Ti, ai, piie), Ri is the event Player i is rational\;R=nieN Ri. Also, Bi(E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and B(E)=neN Bi(E). This is as in Lecture

Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all\strategically relevant\information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be uspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct

Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics

ENGINEERING ECONOMICS II INVESTMENT ANALYSIS Companies(and individuals) invest money in order to earn money Examples Build a factory to make washing machines and dryers → Open laundromat Write novel(what is being invested here?) Get a degree in chemical engineering

选择和管理营销渠道 1、营销渠道是什么(What is the nature of marketing Channels)? 2、公司在设计、管理、评价和修正其渠道时将面临什么 (What decisions do companies face in designing, managing, evaluating, and modifying their channels)? 3、渠道的动态发展趋势是什么(What trends are taking place in channel dynamics)? 4、如何管理渠道的冲突(How can channel conflict be managed)?

Plan .Introduction Brief recall of statistical mechanics and thermodynamics .Molecular dynamics method (MD) .Monte Carlo method (MC) .Illustration of a few applications of MD and MC in the research works carried out in our laboratory .Tutorials on MD and MC