1.1 Information science Definition of information Science Information Science is a trans-disciplinary science with information as its object in study; the laws in information process as its content information methodology as its approach; and the strengthening human information functions particularly the intellectual ability, as its goal

Concept of plant nutrition Plant nutrition is a term that takes into account the interrelationships of mineral elements in the growth medium as well as their role in plant growth

a Positivism / Anti-positivism Chapter one Auguste comte the law of human progress the theological---the metaphysical--- the positive social statics and social dynamics

3.平面曲线的弧长与曲率 1直角坐标情形 y=f(x)(a≤x≤b 设曲线弧由直角坐标方程 给出,其中fx)在 四,上具有一阶连续导数。 现在用元素法来计算这曲线弧的长度.取横坐标x为积分变量,它的变化区间 为可.曲线y=f(x)上 对应于p,上任一小区间[,x+d]的一段弧的长度△s可以用该曲现在点

瑕积分与无穷积分有平行的理论和结果 例11证明瑕积分0x”x当a<2时收敛

一、微积分学基本定理 1.微积分学基本定理 定理1(微积分学基本定理)若函数feC[a,b则面积函数

1函数极限概念 一x趋于∞时函数的极限设函数定义在a,+)上,类似于数列情形我们研究当自变量趋于+∞时,对应的函数值能否无限地接近于某个定数

NOTE: On the“ ethics” of problem sets Some of the theoretical exercise I will assign are actually well-known results; in other cases you may be able to find the answer in the literature. This is certainly the case for the current My position on this issue is that, basically, if you look up the answer somewhere it's your problem. After all, you can buy answer keys to most textbooks. The fact is, you will not have access to such, ehm, supporting material when you take your generals, or, in a more

Introduction This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric- tions on rational play, or perhaps providing a consistency check for our predictions about

Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made for payoff uncertainty