一、博弈论的发展 二、早期的探索

复旦大学：《博弈论 Game Theory》课程教学资源（讲义）第6讲 完全信息动态博智——重复博弈

复旦大学：《博弈论 Game Theory》课程教学资源（讲义）第5讲 完全且非完美信息动态博弈

主要介绍了与本学科相关的几种研究方法和基本原理。从研究方法讲有实证分析与规 范分析方法、演绎与归纳方法、博弈论方法、成本收益分析方法;从基本原理讲主要有: 利己主义和利他主义伦理观、公平与效率观、边际效用论、帕累托原理、委托代理原理 从研究方法讲本章主要掌握什么是博弈论方法、成本收益分析方法;而从基本原理讲则 都较重要对后面的学习影响较大

复旦大学：《博弈论 Game Theory》课程教学资源（讲义）第3讲 静态完全信息博弈——混合策略纳什均衡

复旦大学：《博弈论 Game Theory》课程教学资源（讲义）第2讲 完全信息静态博弈——纯策略纳什均衡

第一节博弈论与主流经济学 传统的新古典经济学(neo--classic economics)的局限 经济学假定人是理性的。理性人是指有一个很好定义的偏好,在面 临给定的约束条件下最大化自己的偏好

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 10: Extensive Games with (Almost)Perfect Information Marciano Siniscalchi October 19, 1999 Introduction Beginning with this lecture, we focus our attention on dynamic games. The majority of games of economic interest feature some dynamic component, and most often payoff uncertainty as well. The analysis of extensive games is challenging in several ways. At the most basic level describing the possible sequences of events (choices)which define a particular game form is not problematic per se; yet, different formal definitions have been proposed, each with its pros and cons

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 12: Repeated Games(1) Marciano Siniscalchi October 26, 1999 Introduction [By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum.] The theory of repeated games is double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 14: General Extensive Games Marciano Siniscalchi November 10, 1999 Introduction [By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 11 and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum.] Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made