第三章外部性理论 第一节外部性的定义 1.外部性的定义 外部性是在没有市场交换的情况下,一个生产单位的生产行为(或消费者的消费行为)影响了其他生产单位(或消费者)的生产过程(或生活标准),如果

第一部分 课程综述 第二部分 课程教学内容 第一章 绪论 第二章 统计数据的搜集与整理 第三章 数据分布特征的描述 第四章 时间数列分析 第五章 统计指数 第六章 抽样与抽样估计 第七章 假设检验 第八章 相关与回归分析 第九章 国民经济统计概述

1 电机的作用与国民经济、生活密不可分 2 电机发展历程及当前状况 3 电机学的学习目的、主要内容及学习方法

Topic 1: What is Corporate Finance?(cont 1 2 Financing Decisions In the previous section the focus was on investment decisions. It was assumed throughout that the firm was financed with equity. In this section we discuss financing decisions. As a prelude to this we will briefly discuss the notion of efficient

This paper is an updated version of a previous working paper, Capital Budgeting in the Presence of Managerial Overconfidence and Optimism, by the same authors. Financial support by the Rodney L. white Center for Financial Research is gratefully acknowledged. The authors would like to thank Andrew Abel, Jonathan Berk, Domenico Cuoco, David Denis, Janice Eberly, Robert Goldstein, Peter Swan, and seminar

the standard theory of co.apters 1 and 2 when we covered Modigliani-Miller As we discussed in the Ch apital structure that has been the mainstay of text- books is the trade-off theory This argues that the benefit of debt is the tax shield and the cost is the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. The tradi tional view was that these deadweight

The term adverse selection comes originally from insurance applications. An insurance contract may attract high-risk individuals, with the result that the pool of insured customers may be riskier than the population at large Adverse selection is now used generically to describe situations of asymmet ric information, particularly market settings in which some individuals have private information about their characteristics and where the individuals

Chapter 2 The Modigliani-Miller theorem \When capital markets are perfect and complete, corporate decisions are trivial.\ 2.1 Arrow-Debreu model with assets 2.1.1 Primitives

The principal-agent problem describes a class of interactions between two parties to a contract, an agent and a principal. The legal origin of these terms suggests that the principal engages the agent to act on his(the principal s behalf. In economic applications, the agent is not necessarily an employe

The principal-agent problem The principal-agent problem describes a class of interactions between two parties to a contract, an agent and a principal. The legal origin of these terms suggests that the principal engages the agent to act on his(the principals) behalf. In economic applications, the agent is not necessarily an employe of the principal. In fact, which of two individuals is regarded as the agent and which as the principal depends on the nature of the incentive problem