第十一章排污收费 第一节庇古税排污费 1.最优庇古税 1.1庇古税的含义 1920年,英国经济学家庇古在《福利经济学》一书中首先提出对污染征收税或费的想法。他建议,应当根据污染所造成的危害对排污者征税,用税收来弥 补私人成本和社会成本之间的差距,使二者相等,这就是“庇古税” 现在,人们把针对污染物排放所征收的各种税费统称为庇古税

第十章环境经济政策 第一节有效率的污染水平 1.边际治理成本和边际损害成本 1.1决定环境容量有效利用(或者污染物有效排放)水平的两项关键因素是边际治理成本和边际损害成本

第一章环境经济学的产生与发展 第一节复活节岛的兴衰 复活节岛是太平洋上一个偏僻荒凉的小岛,面积不足400km2,人口最多时也 不过7000人,它距最近的大陆——南美洲西海岸有3000km之多,距最近的有人居 住的岛屿——皮特凯恩岛也有近2000km之遥。但是它的一部文明兴衰史,却是昭 示人类未来的一面镜子。 考古学家证明,复活节岛曾经有过辉煌的文明。并认为复活节岛的居民属于波 利尼西亚人,公元5世纪到达复活节岛,当时已是全球大迁徙的晚期。公元5世纪 时,复活节岛上土壤肥沃,温度、湿度很高,但是水源奇缺,岛上无常年性河流 仅有的淡水来自死火山形成的湖。由于与世隔绝,生物物种很少,只有30种本地植 在家乡时主要食用鸡、猪、狗、波利尼西亚鼠以及甘薯、芋头、两波利尼西亚人 物、几种昆虫、两种蜥蜴,没有哺乳动物,岛周围水域中鱼也不多

Capital Structure The Modigliani and Miller capital structure and payout policy theorems were the result of the practical questions\How should a firm choose its capital structure\. The theory that we covered last time clarified the nature of the modigliani and miller result

Franklin Allen and Douglas gale Topic 1: What is Corporate Finance? Readings A Ph. D. textbook that provides basic coverage of some of the main topics is J. A. de Matos. Theoretical Foundations of Corporate Finance, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) There are many MBa textbooks. A very good one is R.A. Brealey and S.C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, 7th edition(New York

Bayesian Learning in Social Networks Douglas Gale(Corresponding Author) Department of Economics. New York University

The agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932)has been a major focus of the literature on corporate finance and the theory of the firm over the last twenty years. Various insti- tutional arrangements exist to deal with this agency problem and one that has attracted a lot of attention is the market for corporate control. Manne

Chapter 5 Dynamic Contracting 5.1 Incomplete contracts In our earlier treatment of contracting problems, we assumed that the in- centive problem was generated by asymmetric information, either a problem of moral hazard(hidden actions)or adverse selection(hidden information) The incomplete contracts approach eschews asymmetric information because of its intractability and instead focuses on environments in which informa- tion is observable but not verifiable

9.1 Critique of existing procedures (i) Auctions. The problem with auctions is that assets sold off piecemeal may be sold at a substantial discount The financing problem. It takes too long to raise money from a large number of investors. A small number of investors may be risk averse and unwilling to pay the expected value of the assets

These notes introduce some ideas for modeling markets with adverse selec- tion. This framework was originally intended to deal with markets that cannot be easily accommodated by the standard signaling game e. g, be- cause there is two-sided adverse selection. For present purposes, however, it is enough to deal with the simplest case in which there is adverse selection