Eco514 Game Theory The Trembling Hand: Normal-Form Analysis and Extensive-Form Implications Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction: Invariance In their seminal contribution, Von Neumann and Morgenstern argue that the normal form of a game contains all \strategically relevant\ information. This view, note well, does not invalidate or trivialize extensive-form analysis; rather, it leads those who embrace it to be suspicious of extensive-form solution concepts which yield different predictions in distinct

Eco514 Game Theory Forward Induction Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 8.5: More on Auctions; PS#1 Marciano Siniscalchi October 14, 1999 Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first-and second-price auctions I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 6: Interactive Epistemology(1) Marciano Siniscalchi October 5, 1999 Introduction This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric- tions on rational play, or perhaps providing a consistency check for our predictions about

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 4: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(1) Marciano Siniscalchi September 28, 1999 Introduction The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 2: (Iterated)Best Response Operators Marciano Siniscalchi September 21, 1999 Introduction This lecture continues the analysis of normal-form games. We analyze general, non-zerosum games, emphasizing the informal\equation\: Rational Behavior+ Assumptions about Beliefs=Solution Concepts

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 15: Sequential Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi November 11, 1999 Introduction The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 13: Repeated Games(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 28, 1999 Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so will keep these notes to a minimum.] Review of key definitions

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 11: Subgame Perfection Marciano Siniscalchi October 21, 1999 Introduction The notion of subgame perfection is the cornerstone of the theory of extensive embodies its key intuitions-and provides a vivid example of the difficulties inhere games

Eco514Game Theory 1. Game Theory Multiperson Decision Theory; Zero-Sum games Marciano Siniscalchi September 16, 1999 Administrative Stuff Class: Tue-Thu 10: 40-12: 10 [?] Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment. The Big Picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses