October 22, 2001 Personal IdentityⅢ . Review soul criterion and body criterion Soul criterion: x is the same person as y iff and y have the same soul. Problems: i)There is no way to establish body-soul correlations; and no way to establish personality correlations. So soul criterion doesn't make sense of our practices of recognizing and identifying people ii)We have no special access to souls, so even in our own case we can't be sure it's the same soul \inside\ us whenever we are conscious. ii) The problem of identity is \pushed back\: what is it for person-stage x to have the same soul as person-stage y? What makes for sameness of souls? Body criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same living human body
ral questions that might arise concerning personal identity. When we ask\Who am I? we might be being we are, what our possiblities are, under what conditions\I\would continue to exist. We'll begin our discussionon n wonder what\makes us tick\, what we ultimately value, what matters to us. We might also be asking what sort personal identity with the latter set of questions Consider a parallel set of questions (Id) Under what conditions are baseball-events events in the same game? E. g, under what conditions are a
al Identity ll Problem of synchronic identity for persons: under what conditions are two simultaneous person-events events in the life of the same person? Problem of diachronic identity for persons under what conditions are two person-stages stages in the life of a single person. In particular, what makes a particular person-stage a continuation of me as I am right now? Background desiderata: an account of personal identity should allow for the possibility of anticipation and memory, i.e., of individual psychological connections between different person stages. It should also allow us to justify our practices of
I. Racist Propositions Appiah distinguishes three importantly different ideas relevant to race and racism: Racialism: ...there are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species, that allow us to divide them into a small set of races, in such a way that all the members of these races share certain traits and tendencies with each other that they do not share with members of any other race. These traits and tendencies characteristic of a race constitute, on the racialist view, a sort of racial essence; and it is part of the content of racialism that the essential
The Problem of Induction Although James and Clifford disagree about the reasonableness of belief in a special class of propositions(when they constitute a genuine choice for us), they agree that in the majority of cases empirical investigation and the scientific pursuit of evidence is at least a, if not the proper way to proceed in forming beliefs. It
