1. Machines Extend Proposition 151. 1(the Perfect Folk Theorem with discounting)to arbitrary mixtures of payoff profiles of the original game G=(N, (Ai, lilieN Allow for both rational and real weights on the set of profiles u(a): aE A]; note that the statement of the result will involve an approximation of the payoff profile Construct a machine that implements the strategies in your proof
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Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\to thethe- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e behavioral) characterization of rationalizability a review of the basic definitions For your convenience, I summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive
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Introduction The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium brings both to the fore in a straightforward manner, and emphasizes their interrelation
Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. Review of key definitions Recall our three payoff aggregation criteria: discounting, i.e (u2)≥1>(2 (also recall that the payoff profile corresponding to a stream (ut)is taken to be(1 8)2t18t-u(a)); limit of means
