Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 8.5: More on Auctions; PS#1 Marciano Siniscalchi October 14, 1999 Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first-and second-price auctions I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2

1999年自然变态法试题 1.如何解决我国科研经费投入偏低的问题? 2.请设计一种科学发展模式,它能较好地克服库恩模式和波普尔模式存在地问题? 3.如何从哲学和科学两个层次理解“观察的可重复性”? 4.结合科技史的案例或自己的研究实例,说明科学研究的一般途径?

1992年量子力学考研试题 (类似1999年第一题)质量为m的粒子,在一维无限深势 阱中 0≤ x<0 中运动,若t=0时,粒子处于 y(x

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture8: Applications(1)Simultaneous Auctions Marciano Siniscalchi October 12, 1999 Introduction This lecture, as well as the next, exemplify applications of the framework and techniques developed so far to problems of economic interest. Neither lecture attempts to cover the example applications in any generality, of course; you may however find these topics of sufficient interest to warrant further study

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 7: Interactive Epistemology(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 7, 1999 Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\ to the the- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e. behavioral)characterization of rationalizability

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 5: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(2) Marciano Siniscalchi September 30, 1999 Introduction This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof);

Eco514Game Theory Lecture 3: Nash Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi September 23, 1999 Introduction Nash equilibrium has undoubtedly proved to be the most influential idea in game theory. enabled fundamental breakthroughs in economics and the social sciences. Its development was a major intellectual achievement; what is perhaps more important, it Recent foundational research has emphasized the subtleties in the interpretation of Nash

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 16: Applications of Sequential and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi November 16, 1999 Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 14: General Extensive Games Marciano Siniscalchi November 10, 1999 Introduction [By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 11 and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum.] Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 12: Repeated Games(1) Marciano Siniscalchi October 26, 1999 Introduction [By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum.] The theory of repeated games is double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or