Eco514 Game Theory Problem Set 3: Due Thursday, October 28 1. Asymmetric Auctions Consider an interdependent-values auction with two bidders, each of whom observes an i.i.d uniform signal E [0, 1]. Bidder i's valuation for the object is equal to vi
11-1: utput, Unemployment, and Inflation 11-2: The Medium Run 11-3: Disinflation: A First Pass 11-4: Expectations, Credibility, and Nominal Contracts 11-5: The U.S. Disinflation, 1979 to 1985
In the special case when E's are conditionally independent(though they all depend on the alternative, Ak), P(, E2..)= P(A... -)P() ()P) This is easy to do and can be done recursively
Chapter 3 Topics Constants of Type int and float Evaluating Arithmetic Expressions Declaration for Numeric Types s Implicit Type Coercion and Explicit Type Conversion