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The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium brings both to the fore in a straightforward manner, and emphasizes their interrelation. From subgame perfection to sequential rationality
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This lecture continues the analysis of normal-form games. We analyze general, non-zeros ames, emphasizing the informalequation Rational Behavior Assumptions about Beliefs= Solution Concepts Before we tackle the new material. let us review what we have learned about zerosum games in light of this \equation\. Rational behavior in the context of normal-form games
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Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics
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One of the merits of the notion of sequential equilibrium is the emphasis on out-of- equilibrium beliefs-that is, on beliefs (about past and future play)at information sets that should not be reached if given equilibrium is played. The key insight of extensive-form analysis is that out-of-equilibrium beliefs deter. mine equilibrium behavior. For instance, consider the simple two-stage entry deter- rence game in which potential entrant decides whether to enter a market or stay out, and the incumbent decides whether to fight or acquiesce after the entrant's move
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This lecture continues our analysis of games with payoff uncertainty. The three main objec- tives are: (1) to illustrate the flexibility of the Harsanyi framework (or our version thereof); (2)to highlight the assumptions implicit in the conventional usage of the framework, and the possible departures; (3) to discuss its potential problems, as well as some solutions to the latter
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一、制定本试验大纲的依据 根据2003级教学计划和《食用药用真菌学》的要求,为了达到食用药用真菌学的教学目的和要求制定此大纲。 二、食用药用真菌学实验课在教学中的作用本实验课教学的目的是通过实验课教学,加深学生对所学食用药 用真菌学理论的理解,提高学生的实际动手能力和分析问题和解决问 题的能力。本课程对于学好食用药用真菌学,培养学生的实际动手能 力能力具有非常重要的意义
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1.教材选用及大纲制定依据 本门课程选用教材为全国高等农业院校教材《草原系统工程》,中国农业出版社)。根据草业科学本科专业培养要求,制定本教学大纲。 2.教学环节 本门课程为草业科学等本科专业的专业基础课,其前期基础课为高等数学、线性代数,系统工程,在此基础上开设本门课程。主要教学形式为课堂讲授,主要教学环节为课堂讲授。另外由于系统学理论涉及较多当代较新颖的理论内容,应适当安排学生课下阅
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一、询价 1、采购周期 2、询价要准备的几种文件 3、询价方式 4、书面询价
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第一篇:采购基本概念 一、采购的概念 1、狭义的采购。一手钱,一手货。 2、广义的采购。 易货贸易-物与物交换租赁贸易支付租金
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一、选择题(在A、B、C、D中选择唯一正确的答案,在你认为正确的答案前画V” 错画、多画不给分。)每题2分,共20分。 1、不论在什么样的历史条件下,社会财富的物质内容总是由()构成的 A.价值 B.使用价值 C、交换价值 D.剩余价值 2.把资本划分为固定资本和流动资本() A、是马克思的创举 B.并没有什么实际意义 C.仅仅是为了掩盖剥削
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