1、实证分析和规范分析 实证分析:分析客观经济现象内在因果关系, 从而揭示其运行规律的分析方法。它回答的 是“是什么“、”为什么”的问题,其目的在于陈述 事实。 规范分析:分析和判断经济现象的好坏,进而论 证经济现象应该如何运行的分析方法。它回答的 是“应该是什么”和“应该如何运行”的问题,其目 的在于价值判断

无差异曲线 1、定义:能给消费者带来同等效用水平 或满足程度的两种商品的不同数量的各种 组合点形成的曲线。 2、无差异曲线的效用函数 U, =f (,Y) 3、图形分析:

第七章个体遗传评定 —BLUP法简介 BLUP方法是美Henderson国学者于1948年提出的, 由于这种方法涉及到大量的计算,由于当时计算条件 的限制 ·到20世纪80年代,随着数理统计学尤其是线性模型理 论、计算机科学、计算数学等多学科领域的迅速发展 ,BLUP法在估计家畜育种值方面才得到了广泛应用 ,特别是在大家畜的种用价值评定方面,为畜禽重要 经济性状的遗传改良作出了重大贡献

Eco514Game Theory 1. Game Theory Multiperson Decision Theory; Zero-Sum games Marciano Siniscalchi September 16, 1999 Administrative Stuff Class: Tue-Thu 10: 40-12: 10 [?] Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment. The Big Picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 11: Subgame Perfection Marciano Siniscalchi October 21, 1999 Introduction The notion of subgame perfection is the cornerstone of the theory of extensive embodies its key intuitions-and provides a vivid example of the difficulties inhere games

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 13: Repeated Games(2) Marciano Siniscalchi October 28, 1999 Introduction [Again, by and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so will keep these notes to a minimum.] Review of key definitions

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 15: Sequential Equilibrium Marciano Siniscalchi November 11, 1999 Introduction The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 2: (Iterated)Best Response Operators Marciano Siniscalchi September 21, 1999 Introduction This lecture continues the analysis of normal-form games. We analyze general, non-zerosum games, emphasizing the informal\equation\: Rational Behavior+ Assumptions about Beliefs=Solution Concepts

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 4: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(1) Marciano Siniscalchi September 28, 1999 Introduction The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 6: Interactive Epistemology(1) Marciano Siniscalchi October 5, 1999 Introduction This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric- tions on rational play, or perhaps providing a consistency check for our predictions about