通过本章的学习，你可以了解： 认识失业：定义和度量 失业的代价 失业的种类和经济学解释 失业的治理 吾国吾民：失业在中国

过本章的学习，你可以了解： 短期劳动需求及均衡工资的决定； 长期劳动需求； 中国劳动需求的演变：理论与实证

在上一章中我们都假定劳动者是同质的，在这一章中我们引入人力资本投资理论，从质量的角度来考察劳动供给，并给出不同劳动力质量差异的经济学解释。通过本章的学习，你可以了解： 人力资本投资概述； 教育投资的经济分析； 在职培训的经济分析; 中国的教育和人力资本投资;

导论 “掌握劳动经济学的基本原理, 是理解大量的社会问题和社会计划所 必需的,无论是在美国还是在其它地 方,都是如此

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 4: Games with Payoff Uncertainty(1) Marciano Siniscalchi September 28, 1999 Introduction The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed

“工程经济”是一门应用性经济学科,是工程学和经济学相互交叉融合而形成的边缘性学科。它的研究对象是工程项目技术方案的经济效益。其研 究内容合任务是运用工程经济分析原理与方法,对能够完成工程项目预定目标的各种可行技术方案进行技术经济论证、比较、计算和评价,优选出技术 上先进、经济上有利、生产上适用的方案,从而为实现正确的投资决策提供科学依据

微观经济学的形成 市场需求理论的现代理论是以 Alfred Marshall(1842- 1924)建立的体系为依据的,他的代表作是1890年的 Principles of Economics《经济学原理》, 古典学派的创始人是 Adam Smith(1723-1790):他 的代表作是 An Inquiry into Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nation《国民财富的性质和原因的研究》

Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics

THE TWO BASIC INVESTMENT CONCERNS PROFITABILITY (HOW MUCH MONEY WILL I MAKE?) risK (WHAT ARE MY CHANCES OF MAKING IT?)

Nash equilibrium has undoubtedly proved to be the most influential idea in game theory. enabled fundamental breakthroughs in economics and the social sciences. Its development was a major intellectual achievement; what is perhaps more important, it Recent foundational research has emphasized the subtleties in the interpretation of Nash equilibrium. This lecture deals with the technical details of equilibrium analysis, but also with these interpretational issues. However, a more precise appraisal of the situation must