《国际经济学辅助资料》（英文版） engine9.pdf_大学文库

America's Economy Owned the 90s and Flunked the Millennium". Attention has shifted to Europe where productivity and investment are soaring. China remains the world's most buoyant economy but Japan, too, is growing at a fair clip, catching up after a decade of stagnation Of course these scenarios are flights of economic fancy but they make two serious points First, the world's reliance on America as its only engine is increasingly risky. Second, moving away from a one-engined world will not be painless. In America, in particular, the economy is likely to remain weak for the next few years. That may sound depressing but sluggish growth for another half-decade is much better than a dollar crash a deep recession or a stampede into protectionism a sudden dollar crash precipitated by a big shock in America's financial markets may not be likely but it is certainly possible. The longer that America's current-account deficit -and hence into recession. Spiking interest rates would deflate American consumer spending. A soar2g its reliance on foreign capital-continues to grow the greater the risk that a shock to America's financial markets will send the dollar crashing. This would probably push the world economy euro would darken Europe s economic outlook. If the euro rose far and fast enough it might even put European monetary union at risk. And poor countries would be hit by a double whammy: a sharp drop in export earnings as the rich world plunged into recession and a sharp rise in interest rates as investors abandoned risky assets Protect us from protectionism But a dollar crash and global recession are not the only gloomy possibilities. Equally worrying and much more likely is a surge in protectionism especially if America' s current-account deficit continues to rise rapidly. In 1985, Congress seriously considered an import surcharge of the sort described in the imaginary scenario above. Many American politicians are already ambivalent towards the Wto. If the government loses a few more big trade cases, that ambivalence could turn to antipathy a slide into protectionism would have grave consequences. since the end of the second world war, America has championed the multilateral approach to freeing global trade though witl varying enthusiasm. If it were to give up this leadership role even temporarily, the global trading system would be in deep trouble. The WTo is a fragile organisation, less than ten years old. It would not survive a lengthy period of American disengagement. The intellectual consensus in favour of free trade particularly in poor countries, could also wither in the face of American protectionism. Poor countries would ask why if it was fine for America to raise barriers against the Chinese threat they should hold back from doing the same. Given that trade integration plays a crucial role in economic development the worlds poorest would find it that much harder to escape from poverty. The most important message, however, comes from the third and most optimistic scenario. It that the best outcome the world economy can hope for in the next few years is a fairly sluggish performance by America' s economy, combined with faster growth elsewhere. A few more years of below-average growth but no serious recession would help america to work off its excessive debt and increase its savings rate. The best-case scenario would be for both Europe and east Asia simultaneously to pick up the slack. That would allow the dollar to decline gradually rather than crash; but with relatively slower growth at home and faster growth abroad, America's

America's Economy Owned the '90s and Flunked the Millennium”. Attention has shifted to Europe, where productivity and investment are soaring. China remains the world's most buoyant economy, but Japan, too, is growing at a fair clip, catching up after a decade of stagnation. Of course these scenarios are flights of economic fancy, but they make two serious points. First, the world's reliance on America as its only engine is increasingly risky. Second, moving away from a one-engined world will not be painless. In America, in particular, the economy is likely to remain weak for the next few years. That may sound depressing, but sluggish growth for another half-decade is much better than a dollar crash, a deep recession or a stampede into protectionism. A sudden dollar crash precipitated by a big shock in America's financial markets may not be likely, but it is certainly possible. The longer that America's current-account deficit—and hence its reliance on foreign capital—continues to grow, the greater the risk that a shock to America's financial markets will send the dollar crashing. This would probably push the world economy into recession. Spiking interest rates would deflate American consumer spending. A soaring euro would darken Europe's economic outlook. If the euro rose far and fast enough, it might even put European monetary union at risk. And poor countries would be hit by a double whammy: a sharp drop in export earnings as the rich world plunged into recession, and a sharp rise in interest rates as investors abandoned risky assets. Protect us from protectionism But a dollar crash and global recession are not the only gloomy possibilities. Equally worrying, and much more likely, is a surge in protectionism, especially if America's current-account deficit continues to rise rapidly. In 1985, Congress seriously considered an import surcharge of the sort described in the imaginary scenario above. Many American politicians are already ambivalent towards the WTO. If the government loses a few more big trade cases, that ambivalence could turn to antipathy. A slide into protectionism would have grave consequences. Since the end of the second world war, America has championed the multilateral approach to freeing global trade, though with varying enthusiasm. If it were to give up this leadership role, even temporarily, the global trading system would be in deep trouble. The WTO is a fragile organisation, less than ten years old. It would not survive a lengthy period of American disengagement. The intellectual consensus in favour of free trade, particularly in poor countries, could also wither in the face of American protectionism. Poor countries would ask why, if it was fine for America to raise barriers against the Chinese threat, they should hold back from doing the same. Given that trade integration plays a crucial role in economic development, the world's poorest would find it that much harder to escape from poverty. The most important message, however, comes from the third and most optimistic scenario. It is that the best outcome the world economy can hope for in the next few years is a fairly sluggish performance by America's economy, combined with faster growth elsewhere. A few more years of below-average growth but no serious recession would help America to work off its excessive debt and increase its savings rate. The best-case scenario would be for both Europe and East Asia simultaneously to pick up the slack. That would allow the dollar to decline gradually rather than crash; but with relatively slower growth at home and faster growth abroad, America's

current-account deficit could be trimmed sharply Just when Mr Thurow published his book on hegemonic decline, America would be set to prove him wrong(once again). with the mbalances worked off, its highly productive and flexible economy would be ready to roar Sadly the chances of such a gradual adjustment are not good. the trend remains towards ever bigger American imbalances and continued reliance abroad on American economic growth. European and Japanese leaders seem to take this for granted, much as they rely on America's security umbrella. Reversing that attitude, and with it the trend towards ever bigger American indebtedness, will take political leadership as well as a large dollop of luck Yet to judge by their rhetoric, todays politicians have little sense of the mess that the world economy is in. The Bush administration does not even acknowledge that there is a problem Europe's leaders are too busy squabbling over who has broken the stability and growth Pact's 3% deficit target to see the global economic picture. And Japan's politicians spend too much time bad-mouthing China and too little offering solutions to their own economic troubles This must change. The Europeans and Japanese need to understand that they are not only facing a demographic hiatus of their own, they are also operating in a global economy that could come seriously unstuck unless they act soon. Chinas leaders, too, need to make the connection between their own economic policy and the global picture. Unless they loosen their dollar peg soon, they will find the protectionist backlash against them will get a great deal orse The heaviest responsibility to act differently however, falls on America itself, which is as guilty as anybody else of causing the worlds current lopsidedness. And until Mr Bush s economic team acknowledges the size of the problem others will hide behind American nonchalance In the 1980s, the turning point came when James Baker, Mr Reagan's Treasury secretary, acknowledged the global imbalances and recognised the risks involved He instigated the plaza Accord not out of an idealistic commitment to the global good but because the global imbalances imperilled America' s own prospects Mr Bush's current team need not -and as this survey has argued probably could not -replay the 1980s. But as in the Reagan days, it must force the world to recognise the need to adjust If America does not lead in global economic policy, no one else will. And if nothing is done the imbalances will worsen and the dark scenarios of financial crashes or protectionism become ever more likely. America's biggest contribution to shifting the world away from one-engined growth -and towards improving its own economic prospects -would be some serious medium-term fiscal belt-tightening. The country,s dramatic shift into budget deficits may have underwritten the American, and thus the global, economy in the short term but it risks making the medium- term problem much worse. Bigger American budget deficits mean bigger current-account deficits and an ever greater American reliance on foreign funding Worryingly, Mr Bush's deficits show no sign of being temporary. The president's tax cuts have not yet been fully phased in, and numerous accounting gimmicks have been used to down their apparent cost. The official estimate of the cost of the latest tax cut is 350 billion over ten years, but most budget-watchers put the real figure at twice that level. Nor is the government merely aiming to give the economy a temporary fillip; its declared intention is to reform America's tax code and entirely eliminate the taxation of investment income. That

current-account deficit could be trimmed sharply. Just when Mr Thurow published his book on hegemonic decline, America would be set to prove him wrong (once again). With the imbalances worked off, its highly productive and flexible economy would be ready to roar. Sadly, the chances of such a gradual adjustment are not good. The trend remains towards ever bigger American imbalances and continued reliance abroad on American economic growth. European and Japanese leaders seem to take this for granted, much as they rely on America's security umbrella. Reversing that attitude, and with it the trend towards ever bigger American indebtedness, will take political leadership as well as a large dollop of luck. Yet to judge by their rhetoric, today's politicians have little sense of the mess that the world economy is in. The Bush administration does not even acknowledge that there is a problem. Europe's leaders are too busy squabbling over who has broken the Stability and Growth Pact's 3% deficit target to see the global economic picture. And Japan's politicians spend too much time bad-mouthing China and too little offering solutions to their own economic troubles. This must change. The Europeans and Japanese need to understand that they are not only facing a demographic hiatus of their own, they are also operating in a global economy that could come seriously unstuck unless they act soon. China's leaders, too, need to make the connection between their own economic policy and the global picture. Unless they loosen their dollar peg soon, they will find the protectionist backlash against them will get a great deal worse. The heaviest responsibility to act differently, however, falls on America itself, which is as guilty as anybody else of causing the world's current lopsidedness. And until Mr Bush's economic team acknowledges the size of the problem, others will hide behind American nonchalance. In the 1980s, the turning point came when James Baker, Mr Reagan's Treasury secretary, acknowledged the global imbalances and recognised the risks involved. He instigated the Plaza Accord not out of an idealistic commitment to the global good, but because the global imbalances imperilled America's own prospects. Mr Bush's current team need not—and, as this survey has argued, probably could not—replay the 1980s. But as in the Reagan days, it must force the world to recognise the need to adjust. If America does not lead in global economic policy, no one else will. And if nothing is done, the imbalances will worsen and the dark scenarios of financial crashes or protectionism become ever more likely. America's biggest contribution to shifting the world away from one-engined growth—and towards improving its own economic prospects—would be some serious medium-term fiscal belt-tightening. The country's dramatic shift into budget deficits may have underwritten the American, and thus the global, economy in the short term, but it risks making the mediumterm problem much worse. Bigger American budget deficits mean bigger current-account deficits and an ever greater American reliance on foreign funding. Worryingly, Mr Bush's deficits show no sign of being temporary. The president's tax cuts have not yet been fully phased in, and numerous accounting gimmicks have been used to massage down their apparent cost. The official estimate of the cost of the latest tax cut is $350 billion over ten years, but most budget-watchers put the real figure at twice that level. Nor is the government merely aiming to give the economy a temporary fillip; its declared intention is to reform America's tax code and entirely eliminate the taxation of investment income. That

suggests there are more tax cuts to come Spend, spend, spend Yet there is scant sign of any spending discipline to match the lower tax revenue. Despite his rhetoric to the contrary Mr Bush has proved himself to be no Scrooge with federal dollars. On his watch, federal spending has soared by more than 20%. Only part of that rise can be explained by higher spending on defence or homeland security Defence spending though, is heading ever higher according to estimates by steven Kosiak at the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He reckons that adding together Mr Bush's grand plans for military modernisation and existing commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the defence budget over the next decade will increase by nearly $700 billion more than assumed in Mr Bush's budget projections And there is more. Mr Bush's planned expansion of Medicare, America' s health-care programme for the elderly to include prescription drugs, will supposedly cost $400 billion over the next decade. But most health-care experts -and privately some economists within the Bush administration too-expect the real bill to be much higher. Far from reforming America's entitlement programmes as baby-boomers head for retirement, Mr Bush is expanding them The risks of these policies have not gone unnoticed in Washington. Democrats have been bemoaning the rise in deficits a decade before the ranks of pensioners are due to swell. Still, it has all seemed a long way off. And yet if this survey proves right America's budget deficit could cause big problems long before the baby-boomers start retiring American policymakers'main responsibility therefore, is to improve the medium-term fiscal outlook. The budget rules that forced discipline on spending and tax-cutting plans during the 1990s must be revived. The bush team must put forward detailed proposals for controlling Medicare costs. The spending frenzy must be controlled and the tax-cutting momentum slowed perhaps even reverse If America acknowledged both the danger posed by global imbalances and its own responsibility for reducing them, putting political pressure on others to play their part would become much easier. In continental Europe, the pressure should be least necessary For the policy recipe that is best for Europe is also best for the world economy: determined structural reforms coupled vith a sensible(read looser) macroeconomic policy In Asia there is a greater tension between the short-term domestic agenda and what the world economy needs. China, as this survey has argued must break the paralysis on its exchange ate and gradually move towards greater flexibility. To support that shift, the Bush team must beat back domestic China-bashers but keep up the pressure on the chinese government for gradual change. At the same time China and America together must push other emerging Asian economies to follow suit In Japan in the short term, the trade-off between domestic requirements and global responsibilities is even more difficult to judge. The global economy needs a stronger yen; the Japanese economy does not. But if the government were to begin serious financial-sector reform and simultaneously to reflate the economy the contradiction would soon disappear, and the yen would strengthen without undue risk to the domestic economy

suggests there are more tax cuts to come. Spend, spend, spend Yet there is scant sign of any spending discipline to match the lower tax revenue. Despite his rhetoric to the contrary, Mr Bush has proved himself to be no Scrooge with federal dollars. On his watch, federal spending has soared by more than 20%. Only part of that rise can be explained by higher spending on defence or homeland security. Defence spending, though, is heading ever higher, according to estimates by Steven Kosiak at the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He reckons that adding together Mr Bush's grand plans for military modernisation and existing commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the defence budget over the next decade will increase by nearly $700 billion more than assumed in Mr Bush's budget projections. And there is more. Mr Bush's planned expansion of Medicare, America's health-care programme for the elderly, to include prescription drugs, will supposedly cost $400 billion over the next decade. But most health-care experts—and privately some economists within the Bush administration too—expect the real bill to be much higher. Far from reforming America's entitlement programmes as baby-boomers head for retirement, Mr Bush is expanding them. The risks of these policies have not gone unnoticed in Washington. Democrats have been bemoaning the rise in deficits a decade before the ranks of pensioners are due to swell. Still, it has all seemed a long way off. And yet if this survey proves right, America's budget deficit could cause big problems long before the baby-boomers start retiring. American policymakers' main responsibility, therefore, is to improve the medium-term fiscal outlook. The budget rules that forced discipline on spending and tax-cutting plans during the 1990s must be revived. The Bush team must put forward detailed proposals for controlling Medicare costs. The spending frenzy must be controlled and the tax-cutting momentum slowed, perhaps even reversed. If America acknowledged both the danger posed by global imbalances and its own responsibility for reducing them, putting political pressure on others to play their part would become much easier. In continental Europe, the pressure should be least necessary. For the policy recipe that is best for Europe is also best for the world economy: determined structural reforms coupled with a sensible (read looser) macroeconomic policy. In Asia there is a greater tension between the short-term domestic agenda and what the world economy needs. China, as this survey has argued, must break the paralysis on its exchange rate and gradually move towards greater flexibility. To support that shift, the Bush team must beat back domestic China-bashers but keep up the pressure on the Chinese government for gradual change. At the same time China and America together must push other emerging Asian economies to follow suit. In Japan, in the short term, the trade-off between domestic requirements and global responsibilities is even more difficult to judge. The global economy needs a stronger yen; the Japanese economy does not. But if the government were to begin serious financial-sector reform and simultaneously to reflate the economy, the contradiction would soon disappear, and the yen would strengthen without undue risk to the domestic economy