Introduction This lecture, as well as the next, exemplify applications of the framework and techniques developed so far to problems of economic interest. Neither lecture attempts to cover the example applications in any generality, of course; you may however find these topics of sufficient interest to warrant further study Auction theory is generally indicated as one of the \success stories\of game theory There is no doubt that the game-theoretic analysis of auctions has informed design decisions

Introduction This lecture focuses on the interpretation of solution concepts for normal-form games. You will recall that, when we introduced Nash equilibrium and Rationalizability, we mentioned numerous reasons why these solution concepts could be regarded as yielding plausible restric- tions on rational play, or perhaps providing a consistency check for our predictions about

The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed envelopes. The object is then allocated to the highest bidder at a price which depends on every bid, according to some prespecified rule (e.g. \first-price\ or \second-price\rule). In

Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer to OR for details and definitions: I am following the textbook quite closely. of the game in which an incumbent faces a sequence of K (potential) entrants. It is clear that, in the subgame in which the last entrant gets a chance to play, the incumbent will

◼ Dynamic games of complete information ◼ Extensive-form representation ◼ Dynamic games of complete and perfect information ◼ Game tree ◼ Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium ◼ Backward induction ◼ Applications ◼ Dynamic games of complete and imperfect information ◼ More applications ◼ Repeated games

第一节 前言 一、公共经济学的起源 二、中国日益严重的公共问题 第二节 公共经济学的方法论基础 一、实证分析与规范分析 二、归纳法与演绎法 三、博弈论方法 四、成本与收益分析法 第三节 公共经济学的理论基础 一、公共经济的理论架构 二、从个人主义向集体主义转变 三、公平与效率原理四、边际革命 四、帕累托原理六、委托与代理理论

◼ Dynamic games of complete information ◼ Extensive-form representation ◼ Dynamic games of complete and perfect information ◼ Game tree ◼ Subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium ◼ Backward induction ◼ Applications ◼ Dynamic games of complete and imperfect information ◼ More applications ◼ Repeated games

《保险学》 《博弈论与信息经济学》 《财政与税收》 《产业组织理论与实践》 《当代中国经济》 《电子金融》 《风险管理》 《公司金融》 《国际结算》 《国际金融》 《国际经济学》 《国际贸易理论与政策》 《国际贸易实务》 《国际商法》 《国际商务谈判》 《国际市场营销》 《海关实务》 《宏观经济统计分析》 《宏观经济学》 《计量经济学》 《金融工程》 《金融监管理论与实务》 《金融市场学》 《金融学 A》 《经济思想史》 《农产品国际贸易》 《农村金融学》 《企业经济学》 《区域经济学》 《商务英语》 《商业银行经营学》 《投资学原理》 《投资银行理论与实务》 《微观经济学》 《现代农业经济学》 《项目评估与管理》 《新制度经济学》 《证券投资理论与实务》 《政治经济学》

第一章 牌力估算与开叫 第二章 一阶低花开叫后的叫牌 第三章 一阶高花开叫后的叫牌 第四章 1NT开叫后的叫牌 第五章 高阶开叫 第六章 满贯叫牌

《经济学类专业导论》 《认识实习》 《国际经济学（英语）》 《国际商务谈判》 《宏观经济学》 《世界经济概论》 《中国对外贸易概论》 《自贸区理论与实践》 《国际商法（英语）》 《微观经济学》 《国际贸易融资（英语）》 《国际招投标》 《国际服务贸易》 《计量经济学》 《国际贸易综合实验》 《策略：博弈论基础》 《国际贸易地理》 《国际贸易学》 《合同法学基础》 《机电产品贸易项目管理》 《跨境电子商务实验》 《数字货币经济分析》 《数字经济》 《数字贸易与产业发展》 《国际投资学》 《跨国公司与全球化运营》 《外贸英语函电（英语）》 《进出口贸易实务》 《国际贸易理论与实务》 《国际货运代理实务》 《毕业实习》 《毕业设计（论文）》