第二类曲线积分 设L 为空间中一条可求长的连续曲线，起点为 A，终点为B（这 时称L 为定向的）。一个质点在力 F(x, y,z) = P(x, y,z)i + Q(x, y,z) j + R(x, y,z)k 的作用下沿L 从 A移动到B ， 我们要计算F(x, y,z)所作的 功

第1题席位分配 1比例加惯例2。Q值方法3. d hondt方法 已知pn已有nn增加1席 A|235117.578.358,75 给p/n1+1最大的一方 B333166.511183.25 C432216144108864·使分配的pn尽量接近,即 max(min(o)) A322443 B333555 s.∑n 667 总计101010|151515

一、单项选择题(本大题共10小题,每小题2分,共20分) 在每小题列出的四个备选项中只有一个是符合题目要求的,请将其代码填写在题后的括号内。错选、多选或未选均无分。 1.对任意n阶方阵A、B总有() A.AB-BA

一、单项选择题(本大题共10小题,每小题2分,共20分) 在每小题列出的四个备选项中只有一个是符合题目要求的,请将其代码填写在题后的括 号内。错选、多选或未选均无分。 1.对任意n阶方阵A、B总有() A.AB-BA

1 Preliminary 11 Introduction 12 Cardinality 13 Topology of the Euclidean space 14 Metric space and Baire Category theorem 15 Continuous functions and Distance in metric space 151 Hausdorff distance and Gromov-Hausdorff distance 152 Invariant of domain 2 Lebesgue measure 21 Exterior measure 22 Measure 23 Borel sets and Measurable sets 24 Linear transformation of measurable sets 25 Sets of positive measure 3 Measurable functions 31 Measurable functions 32 Simple functions 33 Littlewood’s Three principles 4 Lebesgue’s integration theory 41 Integration 42 Interchanging limits with integrals 43 Lebesgue vs Riemann 44 Fubini’s Theorem 5 Differentiation 51 Monotone functions 52 Fundamental theorem of Calculus I 521 A detour: Bounded variation functions 53 Fundamental theorem of Calculus II 54 Lebesgue Differentiation Theorem 6 Function spaces 61 L P spaces 611 Normed vector space 612 A detour: Convexity and Jensen’s inequality 613 Completeness: Banach space 614 Separability 62 Hilbert space:

Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer to OR for details and definitions: I am following the textbook quite closely. of the game in which an incumbent faces a sequence of K (potential) entrants. It is clear that, in the subgame in which the last entrant gets a chance to play, the incumbent will

Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics

The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed envelopes. The object is then allocated to the highest bidder at a price which depends on every bid, according to some prespecified rule (e.g. \first-price\ or \second-price\rule). In