Solubility Vapor pressure and Vapor pressure lowering of solution Boiling-point elevation and freezing-point depression Osmosis

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 10: Extensive Games with (Almost)Perfect Information Marciano Siniscalchi October 19, 1999 Introduction Beginning with this lecture, we focus our attention on dynamic games. The majority of games of economic interest feature some dynamic component, and most often payoff uncertainty as well. The analysis of extensive games is challenging in several ways. At the most basic level describing the possible sequences of events (choices)which define a particular game form is not problematic per se; yet, different formal definitions have been proposed, each with its pros and cons

Reputations can create value in B-to-B markets and support diversification Brands create more value if the products are frequently purchased and in high involvement categories

Reputations can create value in B-to-B markets and support diversification Brands create more value if the products are frequently purchased and in high involvement categories

The wheel of retailing Gain entry with low prices Gain trust and loyalty Add offerings and raise prices Differentiate from new no-frills entrants

The Wheel of retailing GG ain entry with low prices rain trust and loyalty Add offerings and raise prices Differentiate from new no -frills entrants

Eco514 Game Theory Lecture 8.5: More on Auctions; PS#1 Marciano Siniscalchi October 14, 1999 Introduction These notes essentially tie up a few loose ends in Lecture 8; in particular, I exhibit examples of inefficiencies in first-and second-price auctions I would also like to briefly comment on Questions 1 and 2 in Problem Set 2

Eco514 Game Theory Signaling Games Marciano Siniscalchi January 10, 2000 Introduction Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and

Price wars are bad, especially with high fixed costs They reduce current profits and erode customers' perception of product quality Price wars are not inevitable. For example the French and the Germans fight every fifty years but not every year

Price wars are bad, especially with high fixed costs. They reduce current profits and erode customers' perception of product quality. Price wars are not inevitable. For example, the French and the Germans fight every fifty years but not every year. But collusion is illegal