24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger November 7, 2001 Freewill IlI: Libertarianism I. Recap: Compatibilism v. Incompatibilism Hard determinism is the view that determinis is true and that because of this freedom is an illusion. The libertarian agrees with the hard determinist that freewill is incompatible with determinism, but disagrees about which claim should be rejected. The libertarian holds that we have free will, but this is only because determinism is false-free acts occur and are undetermined. The hard determinist and the libertarian are both incompatibilists. Soft determinism, also known as compatibilism, maintains that determinism is true, but also that determinism is

24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger September 19, 2001 Evil and the Free Will Defense Review of the Problem 1)If God exists, she'd be OOG. [By hypothesis] )If an OOG being exists, there would be no evil. [from 1] 3)God exists. [Suppose]

Evidentialism(Clifford): \It is wrong abways, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence\ (p.113) Pragmatism(James): Faced with a genuine choice about what to believe, and where evidence does not decide the matter, we are free to decide it however we want. Oour passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds. (127) In the relevant cases, we are not

The Problem of Induction Although James and Clifford disagree about the reasonableness of belief in a special class of propositions(when they constitute a genuine choice for us), they agree that in the majority of cases empirical investigation and the scientific pursuit of evidence is at least a, if not the proper way to proceed in forming beliefs. It

I. Racist Propositions Appiah distinguishes three importantly different ideas relevant to race and racism: Racialism: ...there are heritable characteristics, possessed by members of our species, that allow us to divide them into a small set of races, in such a way that all the members of these races share certain traits and tendencies with each other that they do not share with members of any other race. These traits and tendencies characteristic of a race constitute, on the racialist view, a sort of racial essence; and it is part of the content of racialism that the essential

ral questions that might arise concerning personal identity. When we ask\Who am I? we might be being we are, what our possiblities are, under what conditions\I\would continue to exist. We'll begin our discussionon n wonder what\makes us tick\, what we ultimately value, what matters to us. We might also be asking what sort personal identity with the latter set of questions Consider a parallel set of questions (Id) Under what conditions are baseball-events events in the same game? E. g, under what conditions are a

24.00: Problems of Philosophy Prof. Sally Haslanger October 31, 2001 Freewill: Hard Determinism 1. What is our investment in freewill? Not just a sentimental attachment: At the root of how we organize our own lives(deliberation matters). At the root of how we interact with others(presupposed by praise and blame, punishment)

October 22, 2001 Personal IdentityⅢ . Review soul criterion and body criterion Soul criterion: x is the same person as y iff and y have the same soul. Problems: i)There is no way to establish body-soul correlations; and no way to establish personality correlations. So soul criterion doesn't make sense of our practices of recognizing and identifying people ii)We have no special access to souls, so even in our own case we can't be sure it's the same soul \inside\ us whenever we are conscious. ii) The problem of identity is \pushed back\: what is it for person-stage x to have the same soul as person-stage y? What makes for sameness of souls? Body criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same living human body

al Identity ll Problem of synchronic identity for persons: under what conditions are two simultaneous person-events events in the life of the same person? Problem of diachronic identity for persons under what conditions are two person-stages stages in the life of a single person. In particular, what makes a particular person-stage a continuation of me as I am right now? Background desiderata: an account of personal identity should allow for the possibility of anticipation and memory, i.e., of individual psychological connections between different person stages. It should also allow us to justify our practices of

1. The\Wager\and the Practical Rationality Principle Practical Rationality Principle: The practically rational thing to do is the thing with the highest expected value(or utility \) Version A: Do the thing with higher expected value than all its competitors --In the case of a tie, neither action/belief is permitted Version B: Find the actions with highest expected value and perform whichever of them you like --In the case of a tie, Theism is practically rational. Just like choosing pie over cake 2. Evidentialism(Clifford)