人教A版高中数学必修4第二章 平面向量2.5 平面向量应用举例课件(4)

人教A版高中数学必修4第二章 平面向量2.5 平面向量应用举例课件(2)

人教A版高中数学必修4第二章 平面向量2.5 平面向量应用举例教案

精通美语语音（american accent training）A guide to speaking and pronouncing American English for everyone who speaks English as a second language

离子选择性电极的性能参数 Nernst响应、线性范围、检测下限 以离子选择电极的电位对响应离子活度的负对 数作图(见图),所得曲线称为校正曲线。若这种 响应变化服从于 Nernst方程,则称它为 Nernst响应。此校准曲线的直线部分所对应的离子活度范围称为离子选择电极响应的线性范围。该直线的斜率称为级差。当活度较低时,曲线就逐渐弯曲,CD和FG延长线的交点A所对应的活度a;称为检测下限

人教A版高中数学必修4第二章 平面向量2.5 平面向量应用举例教案(3)

This chapter will explain the origin of the spontaneity of physical and chemical change. Two simple processes are examined. It shows that a property, the entropy can be defined, measured, and used to discuss spontaneous changes quantitatively. This chapter also introduces a major subsidiary thermodynamic property, the Gibbs energy

Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I

The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed envelopes. The object is then allocated to the highest bidder at a price which depends on every bid, according to some prespecified rule (e.g. \first-price\ or \second-price\rule). In many circumstances (e.g. mineral rights auctions)it is reasonable to assume that the value

Signaling games are used to model the following situation: Player 1, the Sender, receives some private information and sends a message m E M to Player 2, the Receiver. The latter, in turn, observes m but not 0, and chooses response r E R. Players'payoffs depend on 0, m and r. What could be simpler? Yet, there is a huge number of economically interesting games that fit nicely within this framework: Spence's job market signaling model is the leading example, but applications abound in IO (limit pricing, disclosure...) finance (security design) and political economics