点击切换搜索课件文库搜索结果(990)
文档格式:PPT 文档大小:497KB 文档页数:23
一、已知无源二端网络ab端电压u=50√2cos(103t+10°)V 电流i=5√2cos(103t-26.9°)A a i 则网络的输入阻抗Z=8+j6 输入导纳y=0.08j0.06S
文档格式:PPT 文档大小:299.5KB 文档页数:8
八.凸集与凸函数 1凸集 (1)凸组合:已知XcR,任取k个点x∈X,如果存在常数 a≥0(i=1,2,k), a1=1,使得ax=x,则称x为x (i=1,2,,k)的凸组合。 (2)凸集:设集合XR,如果X中任意两点的凸组合 仍然属于,则称Ⅹ为凸集
文档格式:PPT 文档大小:87.5KB 文档页数:17
一、选择题: 1若有以下说明和语句,且0
文档格式:PPT 文档大小:164KB 文档页数:37
第14章I/流 14.1C++流的概念 14.2格式化I/O 14.3检测流操作的错误 14.4文件流 14.5字符串流
文档格式:PDF 文档大小:116.58KB 文档页数:6
Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\to thethe- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e behavioral) characterization of rationalizability a review of the basic definitions For your convenience, I summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive
文档格式:PDF 文档大小:74.77KB 文档页数:4
Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and \sequential equilibrium lite, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The main focus is the \reputation\ result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer to OR for details and definitions: I am following the textbook quite closely. of the game in which an incumbent faces a sequence of K (potential) entrants. It is clear that, in the subgame in which the last entrant gets a chance to play, the incumbent will
文档格式:PDF 文档大小:92.42KB 文档页数:5
Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chapters 1l and 12, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. J Games with observed actions and payoff uncertainty Not all dynamic models of strategic interaction fit within the category of games with observed actions we have developed in the previous lectures. In particular, no allowance was made for payoff uncertainty
文档格式:DOC 文档大小:44KB 文档页数:2
课本P122第5题 解:用(K1K2K3)表示三个开关的状态,取值为0时表示闭合,为1时表示打开 则初始状态为(0,1,0)。根据题设要求,一个状态I的下一个状态和I只能有一位取 值不同(此即状态转换规则),据此可以画出状态空间图
文档格式:PDF 文档大小:141.77KB 文档页数:6
Introduction By and large, I will follow OR, Chap. 8, so I will keep these notes to a minimum. ] The theory of repeated games is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it indicates how payoff profiles that are not consistent with Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game might be achieved when the latter is played repeatedly, in a manner consistent with Nash or even subgame-perfect equilibrium On the other hand, it shows that essentially every individually rational payoff profile can
文档格式:DOC 文档大小:60.5KB 文档页数:5
Logistics We(provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10: 40a-12: 10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore please send me email at your earliest convenience so I can add you to the list. You do not want to miss important announcements, do you? the course has a web page at http://www.princeton.edw
首页上页4344454647484950下页末页
热门关键字
搜索一下,找到相关课件或文库资源 990 个  
©2008-现在 cucdc.com 高等教育资讯网 版权所有