1.磁场为有旋场,不能在全空间引入标势。 2.在电流为零区域引入磁标势可能非单值原因:静电力作功与路径无关,E.di=0引入的电势是单值的;而静磁场庄·di一般不为零,即静磁场作功与路径有关,即使在能引入的区域标势一般也不是单值的

Organizational Control Managers must monitor evaluate Are we efficiently converting inputs into outputs? Must accurately measure units of inputs and outputs. Is product quality improving e Are we competitive with other firms? Are employees responsive to customers? customer service is increasingly important. Are our managers innovative in outlook? Does the control system encourage risk-taking

（1)1887年,A.A. Michelson-E. W.Morley实验否定了绝对参考系的存在; （2)1990年,“紫外灾难”; （3)1896年,首次发现放射性现象

5.1分别绘出以下各序列的图形 (1)x(k)=()(k) (2)x(k)=2E(k) (3)x(k)=(--)c(k) (4)x(k)=(-2)c(k) (5)x(k)=2kE(k-1)

一、无穷小量 1定义:极限为零的变量称为无穷小量 定义1如果对于任意给定的正数E(不论它多么小), 总存在正数δ(或正数X),使得对于适合不等式 0X)的一切x,对应的函数值 f(x)都满足不等式f(x)<

BE.410 Spring 2003-Lecture 21 Image removed due to copyright considerations Figure 1 and 2 in Evans, E and A. Yeung Cortical shell-liquid core model for passive flow of liquid-like spherical cells into micropipets Biophysical Journal 56(1): 139-49 July 1989) 和以81mh(m41m如) era rgion incid Arie /dorms a

主要内容小结: 1、C、L元件的VCR; 2、(t)+r2(t=rt 3、三要素法 r(t)=r(∞)+r)-r(∞)e 4、阶跃信号ε(t)与阶跃响应S(t)

1. Asymmetric auctions Consider an interdependent-values auction with two bidders, each of whom observes an i.i.d uniform signal s; E [ 0, 1]. Bidder i' s valuation for the object is equal to

Introduction This lecture presents the two main contributions of \interactive epistemology\to thethe- ory of normal-form games: a characterization of Nash equilibrium beliefs, and a full (i.e behavioral) characterization of rationalizability a review of the basic definitions For your convenience, I summarize the essential definitions pertaining to models of interactive

The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed envelopes. The object is then allocated to the highest bidder at a price which depends on every bid, according to some prespecified rule (e.g. \first-price\ or \second-price\rule). In