1. Machines Extend Proposition 151. 1(the Perfect Folk Theorem with discounting)to arbitrary mixtures of payoff profiles of the original game G=(N, (Ai, lilieN Allow for both rational and real weights on the set of profiles u(a): aE A]; note that the statement of the result will involve an approximation of the payoff profile Construct a machine that implements the strategies in your proof
The vast majority of games of interest in economics, finance, political economy etc. involve some form of payoff uncertainty. A simple but interesting example is provided by auctions: an object is offered for sale, and individuals are required to submit their bids in sealed envelopes. The object is then allocated to the highest bidder at a price which depends on every bid, according to some prespecified rule (e.g. \first-price\ or \second-price\rule). In
1. Offer and quotation: (1)A quotation is often taken by many Chinese business person to stand for a unit price with delivery conditions. e.g. USD324/PC CIF New York; An offer is considered to include more conditions such as shipment, payment, insurance and packing. (2)From the legal point of view a quotation is not an
Model Uncertain Prior analysis assumed a perfect model. What if the model is in correct= actual system dynamics GA(s)are in one of the sets Multiplicative model G,(s=GN(s(1+E(s)) Additive model Gp(S)=GN(S)+E(s) where